IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/grdene/v6y1997i2d10.1023_a1008623627332.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Strategic Manipulation in Committees Using the Plurality Rule: Alternative Concepts and Frequency Calculations

Author

Listed:
  • Dominique Lepelley

    (University of Caen)

  • Boniface Mbih

    (University of Caen)

Abstract

This paper suggests an evaluation of the plurality rule according to how much it can be manipulated by individuals. We analyze strategic voting with reference not only to the usual notion of Nash equilibrium but also to some weaknesses of this notion, depending on the assumptions about how the individual agents choose their strategies. We provide two types of results for each concept of equilibrium: First, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for a profile to be an equilibrium when the plurality rule is used; and second, we present formulas giving the exact frequencies of unstable situations in the three-alternative case.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Lepelley & Boniface Mbih, 1997. "Strategic Manipulation in Committees Using the Plurality Rule: Alternative Concepts and Frequency Calculations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 119-138, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:6:y:1997:i:2:d:10.1023_a:1008623627332
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008623627332
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1023/A:1008623627332
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1023/A:1008623627332?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Elisha A. Pazner & Eugene Wesley, 1978. "Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 45(1), pages 85-91.
    2. Shmuel Nitzan, 1985. "The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 349-370, January.
    3. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    4. Dutta, Bhaskar & Pattanaik, Prasanta K, 1978. "On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 163-170, January.
    5. Peleg, Bezalel, 1978. "Consistent Voting Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 153-161, January.
    6. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Boniface Mbih & Issofa Moyouwou, 2008. "Violations of Independence under Amendment and Plurality Rules with Anonymous Voters," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 287-302, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hiroki Saitoh, 2022. "Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 139-173, July.
    2. Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans, 2017. "Choosing k from m: Feasible elimination procedures reconsidered," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 254-261.
    3. Lirong Xia, 2022. "The Impact of a Coalition: Assessing the Likelihood of Voter Influence in Large Elections," Papers 2202.06411, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
    4. Keiding, Hans & Peleg, Bezalel, 2001. "Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 117-140, November.
    5. Bezalel Peleg, 2013. "Consistent Voting Systems Revisited: Computation and Axiomatic Characterization," Discussion Paper Series dp649, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    6. Aleskerov, Fuad & Karabekyan, Daniel & Sanver, M. Remzi & Yakuba, Vyacheslav, 2012. "On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternatives," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 67-73.
    7. James Green-Armytage & T. Tideman & Rafael Cosman, 2016. "Statistical evaluation of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 183-212, January.
    8. Yuliya A. Veselova, 2020. "Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 523-548, June.
    9. Bezalel Peleg & Ron Holzman, 2017. "Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-17, October.
    10. Cato, Susumu, 2011. "Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 56-59, January.
    11. Gardner, Roy, 1979. "Onymous Consistent Voting Systems," ISU General Staff Papers 197903010800001088, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    12. Bednay, Dezső & Moskalenko, Anna & Tasnádi, Attila, 2019. "Dictatorship versus manipulability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 72-76.
    13. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1986. "Are Bayesian-Nash Incentives and Implementations Perfect?," Discussion Papers 680, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    14. Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2004. "Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 103-116, October.
    15. James Green-Armytage, 2014. "Strategic voting and nomination," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 111-138, January.
    16. Jain, Satish, 2020. "The Strong Consistency of Neutral and Monotonic Binary Social Decision Rules," MPRA Paper 109657, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Ivanov, A., 2022. "On the algorithms of exact estimations of manipulability of social choice rules for the case of 3 alternatives," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 57(5), pages 14-23.
    18. Palash Dey & Y. Narahari, 2015. "Asymptotic Collusion-proofness of Voting Rules: The Case of Large Number of Candidates," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 3(2), pages 120-139, December.
    19. Núñez, Matías & Pivato, Marcus, 2019. "Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 285-305.
    20. Dezső Bednay & Attila Tasnádi & Sonal Yadav, 2022. "On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality kth rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(1), pages 127-148, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:6:y:1997:i:2:d:10.1023_a:1008623627332. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.