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Noncooperative games, coupling constraints, and partial efficiency

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  • Sjur Didrik Flåm

    (University of Bergen)

Abstract

Many noncooperative settings require sharing of aggregate holdings—be these of natural resources, production tasks, or pollution permits. This paper considers instances where the shared items eventually become competitively priced. For that reason, the solution concept incorporates features of Nash and Walras equilibria. Focus is on how the concerned agents, by themselves, may reach an outcome of such sort. A main mechanism is direct bilateral exchange, repeated time and again.

Suggested Citation

  • Sjur Didrik Flåm, 2016. "Noncooperative games, coupling constraints, and partial efficiency," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(2), pages 213-229, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:4:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-015-0079-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s40505-015-0079-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Smith,Vernon L., 2009. "Rationality in Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521133388.
    2. Flam, S. D. & Jourani, A., 2003. "Strategic behavior and partial cost sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 44-56, April.
    3. Sjur Didrik Flåm & Kjetil Gramstad, 2012. "Direct Exchange In Linear Economies," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(04), pages 1-18.
    4. Young, H. Peyton, 2004. "Strategic Learning and its Limits," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199269181.
    5. Allan M. Feldman, 1973. "Bilateral Trading Processes, Pairwise Optimally, and Pareto Optimality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 40(4), pages 463-473.
    6. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
    7. Flam, Sjur & Ruszczynski, A., 2006. "Computing Normalized Equilibria in Convex-Concave Games," Working Papers 2006:9, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    8. Flåm, Sjur Didrik & Gramstad, Kjetil, 2012. "Direct Exchange in Linear Economies," Working Papers in Economics 05/12, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    9. P. Tseng & S. Yun, 2009. "Block-Coordinate Gradient Descent Method for Linearly Constrained Nonsmooth Separable Optimization," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 513-535, March.
    10. L. Xiao & S. Boyd, 2006. "Optimal Scaling of a Gradient Method for Distributed Resource Allocation," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 469-488, June.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coupling constraints; Normalized Nash equilibrium; Partial efficiency; Bilateral exchange; Monotonicity; Stability; Convergence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities

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