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Water demand and ecosystem nexus in the transboundary river basin: a zero-sum game

Author

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  • Md. Arfanuzzaman

    (Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies)

  • Md. Abu Syed

    (Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies)

Abstract

The water demand in the upstream and downstream of a transboundary river basin varies based on the water use by the irrigation projects, dam, hydroelectricity, ecosystem, livelihood practices and household activities of the people. The study considered the case of Teesta river basin and estimates the water demand of upstream, downstream region as well as entire Teesta river basin shared by India and Bangladesh. The water productivity method exercised in the study demonstrates that 2648 and 1971 cumec water is required to fulfill the irrigation demand of command and irrigable areas, respectively, of entire Teesta basin throughout the year against 198, 1472, 793 cumec water discharge in dry, monsoon and lean season. Although there is a substantial water demand for the hydropower projects in the upstream, it is appeared that water required only by the upstream irrigation project is beyond the water supply capacity of the Trans-Himalayan river Teesta during dry and lean season. This may underpin the shortage of water in the lower riparian country, which fuels the zero-sum game in the river basin, where one player is affected by the intervention of the another player. The result from this analysis with zero-sum game perspective may be useful for reviewing transboundary water policies, basin management and development, sustainable water resource management and water sharing mechanism among countries in the transboundary river basin.

Suggested Citation

  • Md. Arfanuzzaman & Md. Abu Syed, 2018. "Water demand and ecosystem nexus in the transboundary river basin: a zero-sum game," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 963-974, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:endesu:v:20:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10668-017-9915-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10668-017-9915-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Binmore, Ken, 2007. "Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300574.
    2. Thomas H. Meek & Laura A. Meek, 2009. "Increasing inequality is already making shortages worse," Nature, Nature, vol. 459(7243), pages 31-31, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Javed Mallick & Roquia Salam & Ruhul Amin & Abu Reza Md. Towfiqul Islam & Aznarul Islam & Md. Nur Alam Siddik & G. M. Monirul Alam, 2022. "Assessing factors affecting drought, earthquake, and flood risk perception: empirical evidence from Bangladesh," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 112(2), pages 1633-1656, June.

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