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Organizing high-end restaurants

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  • Ennio E. Piano

    (Middle Tennessee State University)

Abstract

This paper develops a theory of the organization of high-end restaurants. I identify the high degree of output complexity produced by these establishments as the industry’s fundamental characteristic. This high degree of output complexity leads to reputational investments by restaurants, which in turn affects their organizational structure. In particular, my theory addresses the prevalence of chef-owned establishments in the fine dining industry and the assignment of productive tasks within its kitchens.

Suggested Citation

  • Ennio E. Piano, 2021. "Organizing high-end restaurants," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 165-192, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:22:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s10101-021-00253-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-021-00253-y
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Haute Cuisine; Celebrity chefs; Economics of fine dining;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • L8 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services

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