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A property rights view of multi-unit franchising

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  • Dildar Hussain
  • Josef Windsperger

Abstract

This study develops a property rights explanation of the multi-unit (MU) ownership strategy of the franchise firm. According to the property rights theory, the allocation of residual rights of control (decision and ownership rights) in franchise firms depends on the contractibility of system-specific and local market assets (LMA). We develop and test the following hypotheses: Multi-unit franchising (MUF) is positively related to the franchisor’s intangible system-specific assets and negatively to the franchisee’s intangible LMA. In addition, we argue that impact of financial assets on the tendency toward MUF depends on the contractibility of LMA. Empirical results from the German franchise sector provide partial support of the hypotheses. Compared to the agency theory, which focuses on (complete) incentive contracts that specify residual income rights between the franchisor and franchisee, property rights theory focuses on incomplete contracts that allocate residual control rights between the franchisor and network partners. Furthermore, compared to the resource scarcity theory, property rights theory explains the impact of contractibility of resources/assets on the ownership strategy of the franchise firm. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Dildar Hussain & Josef Windsperger, 2013. "A property rights view of multi-unit franchising," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 169-185, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:35:y:2013:i:2:p:169-185
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-012-9366-8
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    Cited by:

    1. Dildar Hussain & Marijana Sreckovic & Josef Windsperger, 2018. "An organizational capability perspective on multi-unit franchising," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 717-727, April.
    2. Boulay, Jacques & Caemmerer, Barbara & Evanschitzky, Heiner & Duniach, Krista, 2020. "Multi-unit franchising from franchisor and franchisee perspectives: Antecedents, performance outcomes, and the optimal mini-chain size," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 49-58.
    3. Jell-Ojobor, Maria & Windsperger, Josef, 2014. "The Choice of Governance Modes of International Franchise Firms — Development of an Integrative Model," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 153-187.
    4. Muriel Fadairo & Cintya Lanchimba & Josef Windsperger, 2015. "Network Form and Performance. The Case of Multi-Unit Franchising," Working Papers 1502, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    5. Esther Calderon-Monge & Ivan Pastor-Sanz, 2017. "Effects of Contract and Trust on Franchisor Performance," Contemporary Economics, University of Economics and Human Sciences in Warsaw., vol. 11(4), December.
    6. Muriel Fadairo & Cintya Lanchimba & Josef Windsperger, 2015. "Network Form and Performance. The Case of Multi-Unit Franchising," Working Papers halshs-01128075, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multi-unit franchising; Property rights theory; Local market knowledge assets; Financial assets; System-specific assets; Empirical analysis; L22; L26; M21;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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