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Franchise extension and fiscal structure in the UK 1820–1913: a new test of the Redistribution Hypothesis

Author

Listed:
  • Toke S. Aidt

    (University of Cambridge
    CESifo)

  • Stanley L. Winer

    (CESifo
    Carleton University)

  • Peng Zhang

    (Simon Fraser University)

Abstract

The Redistribution Hypothesis predicts that franchise extension causes an increase in state-sponsored redistribution. We test this hypothesis by considering the relationship between franchise extension and selected aspects of fiscal structure at both central and local government levels in the UK from 1820 to 1913. We do so without imposing a priori restrictions on the direction of causality using a novel method for causal investigation of non-experimental data proposed by Hoover (2001). This method is based on tests for structural breaks in the conditional and marginal distributions of the franchise and fiscal structure time series preceded by a detailed historical narrative analysis. We do not find compelling evidence supporting the Redistribution Hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Toke S. Aidt & Stanley L. Winer & Peng Zhang, 2022. "Franchise extension and fiscal structure in the UK 1820–1913: a new test of the Redistribution Hypothesis," Cliometrica, Springer;Cliometric Society (Association Francaise de Cliométrie), vol. 16(3), pages 547-574, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:cliomt:v:16:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s11698-021-00239-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s11698-021-00239-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Franchise extension; Redistribution; Democratization; Causality; Structural breaks; Central government; Historical narrative;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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