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Aided design of market mechanisms for electricity clusters

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  • Mariusz Kaleta

    (Warsaw University of Technology)

Abstract

There are two pillars of sustainable development in the electricity sector: renewable energy and energy efficiency. Both can be addressed by a concept of electrical energy cluster, which is a local area power system that works towards self-balancing. In this paper, we consider the problem of designing the market mechanism for an electrical energy cluster. This task is complex and extensive with ill-defined constraints and criteria. Therefore, we propose the ARchitecture for Market Systems, a well-defined reference architecture that captures the entire design process and helps the designer to navigate through it. The contribution of the paper lies in structuring the cluster mechanism design problem through problem decomposition into several areas called views. Within this architecture, a mechanism is being designed by choosing parameters from the space of solutions, visualising the concept on different schemas, and applying simulation models for evaluation purposes. Based on our reference architecture, we also propose a decision support system (DSS) for the market designer. We prove the usefulness of the approach by implementing a part of the DSS concept and by presenting its application for exemplary cluster design processes.

Suggested Citation

  • Mariusz Kaleta, 2020. "Aided design of market mechanisms for electricity clusters," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 28(4), pages 1291-1314, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:cejnor:v:28:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s10100-019-00640-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10100-019-00640-1
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