IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/sagope/v13y2023i4p21582440231206960.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Perspective of Long-Term and Short-Term Incentives on the Business Environment, Executive Incentive Contracts, and Enterprise Innovation

Author

Listed:
  • Zhaozhen Zhu
  • Yijia Guo
  • Zhao Jiang
  • Xiaojun Chen

Abstract

Innovation is the first driving force leading economic development, and small and medium-sized enterprises have strategic significance in stimulating innovation activity and promoting economic growth. Few studies concentrating on small and medium-sized businesses examine the connection between executive incentive contracts and business innovation. Therefore, we use them as the research object in this study. We empirically analyze the relationship between executive incentive contracts and enterprise innovation using the research sample of small and medium-sized board-listed companies from 2009 to 2020, focusing on long-term equity and short-term pay incentives. The study also analyzes if the corporate environment will impact a specific motivational system. The results show that improving executive shareholding and pay level can significantly promote enterprise innovation. The areas with better business environments mean practical innovation. Otherwise, organizational equity and pay incentives positively affect innovation in non-state-owned enterprises. This effect might increase the business environment compared to state-owned enterprises. Meanwhile, information transparency is improved by equity incentives and pay incentives, and the implementation intensity of equity incentives reduces the degree of financialization. By demonstrating how CEO equity and pay incentives affect corporate innovation, this study adds to the body of literature in that field. It also offers empirical evidence to assist corporations in creating the most corporate equality and pay incentives. Future studies should continue examining the impact of non-material incentives on enterprise innovation and the relationship between equity and pay incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhaozhen Zhu & Yijia Guo & Zhao Jiang & Xiaojun Chen, 2023. "The Perspective of Long-Term and Short-Term Incentives on the Business Environment, Executive Incentive Contracts, and Enterprise Innovation," SAGE Open, , vol. 13(4), pages 21582440231, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:sagope:v:13:y:2023:i:4:p:21582440231206960
    DOI: 10.1177/21582440231206960
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/21582440231206960
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/21582440231206960?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cathcart, Lara & Dufour, Alfonso & Rossi, Ludovico & Varotto, Simone, 2020. "The differential impact of leverage on the default risk of small and large firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    2. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fried, Jesse & Walker, David I, 2002. "Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Stephie Fried, 2018. "Climate Policy and Innovation: A Quantitative Macroeconomic Analysis," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 90-118, January.
    4. Burns, Natasha & McTier, Brian C. & Minnick, Kristina, 2015. "Equity-incentive compensation and payout policy in Europe," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 85-97.
    5. Kelly Shue & Richard Townsend, 2017. "How do Quasi-Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk-Taking?," NBER Working Papers 23091, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Tsang, Albert & Wang, Kun Tracy & Liu, Simeng & Yu, Li, 2021. "Integrating corporate social responsibility criteria into executive compensation and firm innovation: International evidence," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    7. Jean-Etienne de Bettignies & Hua Fang Liu & David T. Robinson & Bulat Gainullin, 2023. "Competition and Innovation in Markets for Technology," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4753-4773, August.
    8. Guay, Wayne R. & Kepler, John D. & Tsui, David, 2019. "The role of executive cash bonuses in providing individual and team incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(2), pages 441-471.
    9. Griffin, Dale & Li, Kai & Xu, Ting, 2021. "Board Gender Diversity and Corporate Innovation: International Evidence," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(1), pages 123-154, February.
    10. Mc Namara, Andrea & Murro, Pierluigi & O'Donohoe, Sheila, 2017. "Countries lending infrastructure and capital structure determination: The case of European SMEs," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 122-138.
    11. Hsu, Yuan-Teng & Huang, Chia-Wei & Koedijk, Kees G., 2023. "Unintended consequences of compensation peer groups on corporate innovation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    12. Kelly Shue & Richard R. Townsend, 2017. "How Do Quasi†Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk†Taking?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 72(6), pages 2551-2588, December.
    13. Xianjun Cai & Huifeng Pan & Chengcheng Gao & Chunyang Wang & Liping Lu, 2021. "Top executive tournament incentives and corporate innovation output," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(5), pages 5893-5924, December.
    14. Tu Nguyen, 2018. "CEO Incentives and Corporate Innovation," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 53(2), pages 255-300, May.
    15. Armstrong, Christopher & Nicoletti, Allison & Zhou, Frank S., 2022. "Executive stock options and systemic risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 256-276.
    16. Brisley, Neil & Cai, Jay & Nguyen, Tu, 2021. "Required CEO stock ownership: Consequences for risk-taking and compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    17. Biggerstaff, Lee & Blank, Brian & Goldie, Brad, 2019. "Do incentives work? Option-based compensation and corporate innovation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 415-430.
    18. Torsten Jochem & Tomislav Ladika & Zacharias Sautner, 2018. "The Retention Effects of Unvested Equity: Evidence from Accelerated Option Vesting," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(11), pages 4142-4186.
    19. Martin Nienhaus, 2022. "Executive equity incentives and opportunistic manager behavior: new evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 1276-1318, December.
    20. Banerjee, Shantanu & Homroy, Swarnodeep, 2018. "Managerial incentives and strategic choices of firms with different ownership structures," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 314-330.
    21. Wruck, Karen H. & Wu, YiLin, 2021. "The relation between CEO equity incentives and the quality of accounting disclosures: New evidence," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    22. Smallbone, David & Saridakis, George & Abubakar, Yazid Abdullahi, 2022. "Internationalisation as a stimulus for SME innovation in developing economies: Comparing SMEs in factor-driven and efficiency-driven economies," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 1305-1319.
    23. Dongying Du & Xiaojian Tang & Huaiming Wang & Joseph H. Zhang & Stephanie Tsui & Dongjie Lin, 2022. "CEO organizational identification and corporate innovation investment," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(3), pages 4185-4217, September.
    24. Aurora Liu Genin & Justin Tan & Juan Song, 2021. "State governance and technological innovation in emerging economies: State-owned enterprise restructuration and institutional logic dissonance in China’s high-speed train sector," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 52(4), pages 621-645, June.
    25. Marta Kadłubek & Eleftherios Thalassinos & Joanna Domagała & Sandra Grabowska & Sebastian Saniuk, 2022. "Intelligent Transportation System Applications and Logistics Resources for Logistics Customer Service in Road Freight Transport Enterprises," Energies, MDPI, vol. 15(13), pages 1-27, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Athanasakou, Vasiliki & Ferreira, Daniel & Goh, Lisa, 2022. "Changes in CEO stock option grants: A look at the numbers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    2. Daniel Beck & Gunther Friedl & Peter Schäfer, 2020. "Executive compensation in Germany," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 90(5), pages 787-824, June.
    3. Ilona Babenko & Benjamin Bennett & John M Bizjak & Jeffrey L Coles & Jason J Sandvik, 2023. "Clawback Provisions and Firm Risk," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(2), pages 191-239.
    4. Bienz, Carsten & Thorburn, Karin & Walz, Uwe, 2019. "Ownership, Wealth, and Risk Taking: Evidence on Private Equity Fund Managers," SAFE Working Paper Series 126, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, revised 2019.
    5. Wruck, Karen H. & Wu, YiLin, 2021. "The relation between CEO equity incentives and the quality of accounting disclosures: New evidence," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    6. repec:oup:rfinst:v:21:y:2017:i:5:p:1805-1846. is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Bloomfield, Matthew J., 2021. "Compensation disclosures and strategic commitment: Evidence from revenue-based pay," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(2), pages 620-643.
    8. Han, Feng & Qin, Qi & Peabody, S. Drew, 2022. "Does incentive conflict between CEOs and CFOs benefit firms? Implications for corporate decision-making," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    9. Chang, Jeffery (Jinfan) & Meng, Qingbin & Ni, Xiaoran, 2022. "A tale of riskiness: The real effects of share pledging on the Chinese stock market," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    10. Qin, Bo & Yang, Lu, 2022. "CSR contracting and performance-induced CEO turnover," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    11. Natalya Zelenyuk & Robert Faff, 2022. "Effects of incentive pay on systemic risk: evidence from CEO compensation and CoVar," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 63(6), pages 3289-3311, December.
    12. Jiang, Jiaoliang & Chen, Yulin, 2021. "How does labor protection influence corporate risk-taking? Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    13. Peng, Juan & Huang, Wenli & Gao, Han & Wang, Hongli, 2022. "Modeling the unintended consequences of short selling for innovation investment," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    14. Ormazabal, Gaizka & Jochem, Torsten & Rajamani, Anjana, 2020. "Why Have CEO Pay Levels Become Less Diverse?," CEPR Discussion Papers 15523, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Zhu, Chunhui & Zhang, Teng & Li, Shaoyu, 2021. "Why more restricted stocks, less stock options?--An explanation based on the preference of regulators of China?," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    16. Karpavičius, Sigitas & Yu, Fan, 2019. "Managerial risk incentives and a firm’s financing policy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 167-181.
    17. Georges Dionne & Olfa Maalaoui Chun & Thouraya Triki, 2019. "The governance of risk management: The importance of directors’ independence and financial knowledge," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 22(3), pages 247-277, September.
    18. Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.
    19. Abdoh, Hussein & Liu, Yu, 2021. "Does R&D intensity matter in the executive risk incentives and firm risk relationship?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 13-24.
    20. Gang Bai & Qiurong Yang & Elyas Elyasiani, 2022. "Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives and Bank Earnings Management: Evidence from FAS 123R," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(21), pages 1-21, October.
    21. Yin, Libo & Lu, Man, 2022. "Oil uncertainty and firms' risk-taking," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:sagope:v:13:y:2023:i:4:p:21582440231206960. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.