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CEO Incentives and Corporate Innovation

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  • Tu Nguyen

Abstract

Using scaled wealth†performance sensitivity as my measure of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentives, and utilizing cross†sectional variations in industry innovativeness, product market competition and firms’ degree of exposure to the market for corporate control for identification purposes, I find that higher long†term incentives that stem from CEO holdings of unvested options are associated with greater subsequent corporate innovation in innovative industries, competitive product markets, and firms more exposed to the threat of hostile takeovers, that is, exactly where incentivizing innovation is a matter of necessity. I address the endogeneity concerns with systems of simultaneous equations estimated using three†stage least squares. A possible channel for the observed relation between unvested options†based incentives and subsequent corporate innovation is that these incentives encourage managers to undertake riskier projects to achieve long†term economic benefits.

Suggested Citation

  • Tu Nguyen, 2018. "CEO Incentives and Corporate Innovation," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 53(2), pages 255-300, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:finrev:v:53:y:2018:i:2:p:255-300
    DOI: 10.1111/fire.12144
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    Cited by:

    1. Natasha Burns & Andrew Keithley & Kristina Minnick & Mia L. Rivolta, 2022. "When in Rome: Local social norms and income differences," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 457-484, August.
    2. Zhou, Bing & Li, Yu-meng & Sun, Fang-cheng & Zhou, Zhong-guo, 2021. "Executive compensation incentives, risk level and corporate innovation," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(C).
    3. Abdoh, Hussein & Liu, Yu, 2021. "Does R&D intensity matter in the executive risk incentives and firm risk relationship?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 13-24.
    4. Tu Nguyen & Jing Zhao, 2021. "Industry tournament incentives and corporate innovation," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(9-10), pages 1797-1845, October.
    5. Biggerstaff, Lee & Blank, Brian & Goldie, Brad, 2019. "Do incentives work? Option-based compensation and corporate innovation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 415-430.
    6. Hussein Abdoh & Yu Liu, 2021. "Executive risk incentives, product market competition, and R&D," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 56(1), pages 133-156, February.
    7. Zhaozhen Zhu & Yijia Guo & Zhao Jiang & Xiaojun Chen, 2023. "The Perspective of Long-Term and Short-Term Incentives on the Business Environment, Executive Incentive Contracts, and Enterprise Innovation," SAGE Open, , vol. 13(4), pages 21582440231, November.
    8. Emmanuel Adu‐Ameyaw & Albert Danso & Linda Hickson, 2022. "Growth opportunity and investment policy: The role of managerial incentives," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3634-3646, December.

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