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Games Prisoners Play

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  • Marek M. Kaminski

Abstract

A new inmate, or `rookie', who enters a total institution usually faces `tests' and `games' organized by the `old crew'. In this article I argue that such initiation rituals are often designed by inmates in order to uncover a rookie's personal characteristics, such as toughness and cleverness. While such rituals may seem violent, they usually involve more skillful deception and tricks than pain and suffering. The basic idea is to persuade the rookie that he or she faces some tough choices - and watch his or her reaction to adverse or unusual circumstances. The mock character of a typical test creates a fundamental problem for its validity, since an informed rookie can simulate both toughness and cleverness. Thus, an informed rookie cannot be distinguished from one with the desired characteristics. This problem is well recognized by most knowledgeable inmates and motivates them to search for new games and tests. The result is a wide variety of competing tests, frequent changes of argot and the secret code of behavior. The initiation rituals are modeled as simple games and decision problems. The ethnographic material was collected by the author as a political prisoner in Poland in 1985.

Suggested Citation

  • Marek M. Kaminski, 2003. "Games Prisoners Play," Rationality and Society, , vol. 15(2), pages 188-217, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:15:y:2003:i:2:p:188-217
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463103015002002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Reisig, Michael D. & Lee, Yoon Ho, 2000. "Prisonization in the Republic of Korea," Journal of Criminal Justice, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 23-31.
    3. Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. "Psychological games and sequential rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 60-79, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Skarbek, David, 2012. "Prison gangs, norms, and organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 96-109.
    2. Nese, Annamaria & O'Higgins, Niall & Sbriglia, Patrizia & Scudiero, Maurizio, 2018. "Cooperation, punishment and organized crime: a lab-in-the-field experiment in southern Italy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 86-98.
    3. Christoph Engel & Lilia Zhurakhovska, 2016. "When is the risk of cooperation worth taking? The prisoner’s dilemma as a game of multiple motives," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(16), pages 1157-1161, November.
    4. Ennio E Piano & Byron B Carson, 2020. "Scalp-taking," Rationality and Society, , vol. 32(1), pages 40-66, February.
    5. Roth, M. Garrett & Skarbek, David, 2014. "Prison Gangs and the Community Responsibility System," Review of Behavioral Economics, now publishers, vol. 1(3), pages 223-243, May.

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