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Social status and crime

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Author Info
Emrah Arbak () (GATE CNRS)

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Abstract

We consider a large population of agents choosing either to engage in a criminal activity or working. Individuals feel varying degrees of selfreproach if they commit criminal acts. In addition, they are concerned with their social status in society, based on others’ perceptions of their values. In making their decisions, individuals weigh both the material and social risks of being a criminal and a worker. We find that introducing social status concerns may induce multiple equilibria. We also consider the implications of intragroup and intergroup interactions in an economy with two classes of earning abilities. Typically, there is more crime in the low ability group and increasing punishment reduces crime, but the opposite may also be true.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure in its series Working Papers with number 0510.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:0510

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Related research
Keywords: Crime; Social identity; Asymmetric information; Behavioral game theory;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Imrohoroglu, Ayse & Merlo, Antonio & Rupert, Peter, 2000. "On the Political Economy of Income Redistribution and Crime," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 1-25, February.
    Other versions:
  2. Glaeser, Edward L & Sacerdote, Bruce & Scheinkman, Jose A, 1996. "Crime and Social Interactions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(2), pages 507-48, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Benabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," IDEI Working Papers 389, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jšrgen W. Weibull, 1999. "Social Norms And Economic Incentives In The Welfare State," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 2001. "Moral Rules and the Moral Sentiments: Toward a Theory of an Optimal Moral System," NBER Working Papers 8688, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Rasmusen, Eric, 1996. "Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 519-43, October.
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  7. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-77, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. John P. Conley & Ping Wang, 2004. "Crime, Ethics and Occupational Choice: Endogenous Sorting in a Closed Model," Working Papers 0402, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  9. Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. "Psychological games and sequential rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 60-79, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Sah, Raaj K, 1991. "Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(6), pages 1272-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Robert Dur, 2006. "Status-Seeking in Violent Subcultures and the Double Dividend of Zero-Tolerance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-005/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  2. Robert Dur, 2006. "Status-Seeking in Criminal Subcultures and the Double Dividend of Zero-Tolerance," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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