IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/pubfin/v24y1996i2p173-191.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Behavior of Bureaucrats and the Choice Between Single-Purpose and Multi-Purpose Authorities

Author

Listed:
  • Lars-Erik Borge

    (University of Trondheim)

Abstract

The constitutional choice between single-purpose and multi-purpose authorities is analyzed in a model describing the local decision-making process as a game between a sponsor, representing the voters, and two bureaus. The bureaus are able to influence public decisions by using private information about production costs. In this context, the bureaus always benefit from coordinated cost reporting, whereas the effect on voter welfare is shown to depend on the sign of the Cournot cross-price-elasticities. Given that collusion is more likely to occur in multi-purpose authorities, the analysis provides some guidelines when choosing between single-purpose and multi-purpose authorities.

Suggested Citation

  • Lars-Erik Borge, 1996. "The Behavior of Bureaucrats and the Choice Between Single-Purpose and Multi-Purpose Authorities," Public Finance Review, , vol. 24(2), pages 173-191, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:24:y:1996:i:2:p:173-191
    DOI: 10.1177/109114219602400204
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/109114219602400204
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/109114219602400204?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dunne, John Paul & Pashardes, Panos & Smith, Ronald P, 1984. "Needs, Costs and Bureaucracy: The Allocation of Public Consumption in the UK," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(373), pages 1-15, March.
    2. Robert Mackay & Carolyn Weaver, 1981. "Agenda control by budget maximizers in a multi-bureau setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 447-472, January.
    3. Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Theories of oligopoly behavior," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 329-414, Elsevier.
    4. Deacon, Robert T, 1978. "A Demand Model for the Local Public Sector," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(2), pages 184-192, May.
    5. McMillan, Melville L & Amoako-Tuffour, Joe, 1988. "An Examination of Preferences for Local Public Sector Outputs," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 70(1), pages 45-54, February.
    6. Ehrenberg, Ronald G, 1973. "The Demand for State and Local Government Employees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 366-379, June.
    7. Wagner, Richard E & Weber, Warren E, 1975. "Competition, Monopoly, and the Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 661-684, December.
    8. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    9. Jan K. Brueckner & Kangoh Lee, 1991. "Economies of Scope and Multiproduct Clubs," Public Finance Review, , vol. 19(2), pages 193-208, April.
    10. Chan, Kenneth S. & Mestelman, Stuart, 1988. "Institutions, efficiency and the strategic behaviour of sponsors and bureaus," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 91-102, October.
    11. Moene, Karl O., 1986. "Types of bureaucratic interaction," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 333-345, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gervan Fearon, 2001. "Endogenous public sector budgeting: to centralize or not?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(2), pages 504-524, May.
    2. Dinar, Ariel & Kemper, Karin & Blomquist, William & Diez, Michele & Sine, Gisele & Fru, William, 2005. "Decentralization of river basin management : a global analysis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3637, The World Bank.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Witterblad, Mikael, 2008. "Essays on Redistribution and Local Public Expenditures," Umeå Economic Studies 731, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    2. George TRIDIMAS, 2006. "The economics and empirics of the allocation of public consumption expenditures," Departmental Working Papers 2006-02, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    3. Lars-Erik Borge & Jørn Rattsø, 1998. "Demographic Shift, Relative Costs and the Allocation of Local Public Consumption in Norway," Chapters, in: Jørn Rattsø (ed.), Fiscal Federalism and State–local Finance, chapter 5, pages 71-92, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Kenneth Greene, 1984. "Sequential referenda and bureaucratic man," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 77-82, January.
    5. Witterblad, Mikael, 2008. "The Demand for Local Public Services in Sweden," Umeå Economic Studies 730, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    6. D.P. Doessel & Abbas Valadkhani, 2002. "Public Finance and The Size of Government: A Literature Review and Econometric Results for Fiji," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 108, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.
    7. Kai A. Konrad & Sebastian G. Kessing, 2008. "Time Consistency and Bureaucratic Budget Competition," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 1-15, January.
    8. Benoît Le Maux, 2009. "Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the theoretical literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 447-465, December.
    9. Samarth Vaidya, 2004. "Bureaucratic Provision: Influencing vs. Lying," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 251, Econometric Society.
    10. Pitarakis, Jean-Yves & Tridimas, George, 1999. "Total expenditure endogeneity in a system of demand for public consumption expenditures in the UK," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 279-291, April.
    11. Shirley Kress, 1989. "Niskanen effects in the California Community Colleges," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 127-140, May.
    12. Lars-Erik Borge & Torberg Falch & Per Tovmo, 2008. "Public sector efficiency: the roles of political and budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity, and democratic participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 475-495, September.
    13. Samarth Vaidya, 2009. "Influencing The Public And Efficiency In Bureaucratic Provision," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 259-274, May.
    14. Carlsen, Fredrik, 1996. "A note on budget schemes in the public sector," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 149-156, April.
    15. John Carter & David Schap, 1987. "Executive veto, legislative override, and structure-induced equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 227-244, January.
    16. Victor V. Claar, 1998. "An Incentive-Compatibility Approach To the Problem of Monitoring a Bureau," Public Finance Review, , vol. 26(6), pages 599-610, November.
    17. Jean-Yves Pitarakis & George Tridimas, 1998. "The allocation of public consumption expenditure in the UK," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(3), pages 197-200.
    18. Silvia Fedeli & Michele Santoni, 2001. "Endogenous institutions in bureaucratic compliance games," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 203-229, November.
    19. Falch, Torberg, 2001. "Collective bargaining in the public sector and the role of budget determination," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 75-99, March.
    20. Geys, Benny & Heinemann, Friedrich & Kalb, Alexander, 2010. "Voter involvement, fiscal autonomy and public sector efficiency: Evidence from German municipalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 265-278, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:24:y:1996:i:2:p:173-191. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.