Bureaucratic Provision: Influencing vs. Lying
AbstractIn this paper a public bureau can extract surplus value from the services it provides not only by misrepresenting its production costs to its oversight committee but also by influencing the perceptions of the legislative body such as the parliament or the congress and the public at large by costly argumentation. By juxtaposing the bureau's ability to "influence" with its ability to misreport or "lie", I examine the impact influencing might have on the bureau's incentives to lie and on the efficiency of bureaucratic provision. I find that a truth-telling equilibrium could exist where the bureau's ability to influence would deter it from lying and the level of bureaucratic provision would be efficient. However, there could also be an equilibrium where the bureau would lie in which case there would be either over-production or under-production. This suggests that even when the bureau only cares about extracting the surplus value of its production, there could still be over-production simply due to the bureau's ability to distort cost information
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings with number 251.
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Phone: 1 212 998 3820
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp
More information through EDIRC
Bureaucracy; Influence; Truth-Telling;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Carroll, Kathleen A, 1989. "Industrial Structure and Monopoly Power in the Federal Bureaucracy: An Empirical Analysis," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(4), pages 683-703, October.
- Chan, Kenneth S. & Mestelman, Stuart, 1988. "Institutions, efficiency and the strategic behaviour of sponsors and bureaus," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 91-102, October.
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996.
"Contest Success Functions,"
Economic Theory, Springer,
Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
- Hirshleifer, Jack & Osborne, Evan, 2001. " Truth, Effort, and the Legal Battle," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 108(1-2), pages 169-95, July.
- Moene, Karl O., 1986. "Types of bureaucratic interaction," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 333-345, April.
- Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-43, December.
- Breton, Albert & Wintrobe, Ronald, 1975. "The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen's Theory of Bureaucracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(1), pages 195-207, February.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.