The Effectiveness of Incentive Mechanisms in Major League Baseball
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DOI: 10.1177/1527002502003003002
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- Robert Simmons & David Berri, 2005. "Race and evaluation of signal callers in the National Football League," IASE Conference Papers 0511, International Association of Sports Economists.
- Rob Simmons & David Berri, 2008. "Race and the Evaluation of Signal Callers in the National Football League," IASE Conference Papers 0825, International Association of Sports Economists.
- D Berri & R Simmons, 2007. "Race and the evaluation of signal callers in the national football league," Working Papers 591147, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
- Joshua Congdon-Hohman & Jonathan A. Lanning, 2013.
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- Joshua Congdon-Hohman & Jonathan A. Lanning, 2013. "Workers' Responses to Incentives: The Case of Pending MLB Free Agents," Working Papers 1301, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
- Quinn Keefer, 2021. "Sunk costs in the NBA: the salary cap and free agents," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 61(6), pages 3445-3478, December.
- David J. Berri & John Charles Bradbury, 2010. "Working in the Land of the Metricians," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 11(1), pages 29-47, February.
- Anthony C. Krautmann & John L. Solow, 2009. "The Dynamics of Performance Over the Duration of Major League Baseball Long-Term Contracts," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 10(1), pages 6-22, February.
- Anthony C. Krautmann & Thomas D. Donley, 2009. "Shirking in Major League Baseball Revisited," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 10(3), pages 292-304, June.
- Richard J. Paulsen, 2018. "Contract Options and Performance: The Case of Major League Baseball," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 46(4), pages 379-388, December.
- Stephen T. Easton & Duane W. Rockerbie, 2005. "Overtime! Rules and Incentives in the National Hockey League," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 6(2), pages 178-202, May.
- Babatunde Buraimo & Bernd Frick & Michael Hickfang & Rob Simmons, 2015. "The Economics of Long-term Contracts in the Footballers' Labour Market," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 62(1), pages 8-24, February.
- Kevin J. Stiroh, 2007. "Playing For Keeps: Pay And Performance In The Nba," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(1), pages 145-161, January.
- Heather O’Neill, 2013. "Do Major League Baseball Hitters Engage in Opportunistic Behavior?," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 19(3), pages 215-232, August.
- Steven Salaga & Brian M. Mills & Scott Tainsky, 2020. "Employer-Assigned Workload and Human Capital Deterioration: Evidence From the National Football League," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 21(6), pages 628-659, August.
- Joshua D. Pitts & Brent A. Evans, 2023. "New contracts and dismissal threats from highly drafted rookies: What motivates NFL quarterbacks?," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(1), pages 4-16, January.
- Fumarco, Luca & Longley, Neil & Palermo, Alberto & Rossi, Giambattista, 2024. "Strategic Behaviours in a Labour Market with Mobility-Restricting Contractual Provisions: Evidence from the National Hockey League," IZA Discussion Papers 16836, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Joshua M. Congdon-Hohman & Jonathan A. Lanning, 2018.
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- Joshua Congdon-Hohman & Jonathan A. Lanning, 2013. "Workers' Responses to Incentives: The Case of Pending MLB Free Agents," Working Papers 1304, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
- Joshua Congdon-Hohman & Jonathan A. Lanning, 2017. "Beyond Moneyball: Changing Compensation in MLB," Working Papers 1702, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
- Jahn K. Hakes & Chad Turner, 2008. "Long-Term Contracts in Major League Baseball," Working Papers 0831, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
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