The Structure of Incentives in a Major Information Systems Outsourcing Contract: The Case of a North American Public Organization
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Agency theory; Outsourcing; Théorie des mandats ; Impartition ; Sous-traitance;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
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