Capital Structure and Team Performance in Professional Baseball
AbstractThe successful production of major league sports has become increasingly dependent on stadiums. Although stadiums do not exhibit the properties of public goods, they have increasingly become governmentally funded projects. Lost in the political debate over stadium funding is the usefulness of the residual claimancy argument to the success of a team. If this argument holds, receiving a publicly financed stadium mitigates the incentive for an owner to place a competitive product on the field. The evidence in this article demonstrates that public ownership of a stadium negatively affects the winning percentage of the team that plays in it.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal Journal of Sports Economics.
Volume (Year): 2 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
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- Bodvarsson, Örn B. & Humphreys, Brad R., 2009. "Labor Market Discrimination and Capital Investment: The Effects of Fan Discrimination on Stadium Investment," IZA Discussion Papers 4551, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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