Impact of Bank Mergers on Shareholders’ Wealth: A Review of Literature
AbstractThe main motive of any Merger and Acquisitions (M&As) is to increase of the wealth for the shareholders which in turn forms the main goal of any firm. The main categories of motives identified include those that increase shareholder value and those that destroy shareholder value. Motives which increase shareholder value include; synergy, achievement of economies of scale and scope, increased market power and revenue growth, improvement of managerial efficiency. Motives which decrease shareholder value include managerial hubris, agency and diversification. There are three main types of M&As which are horizontal, vertical and conglomerate. The study lastly examines the methods of financing M&As, the relative size and the number of bidders of the target firms.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences in its journal International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences.
Volume (Year): 2 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Web page: http://hrmars.com/index.php/pages/detail/Accounting-Finance-Journal
Mergers; acquisitions; organisational factors;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
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