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Structural Embeddedness and Intergroup Conflict

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  • Károly Takács

    (ICS/Department of Sociology, University of Groningen, the Netherlands)

Abstract

Social structure affects the likelihood of group conflicts, although it has been disregarded by previous explanations. This study extends the intergroup public goods game model and integrates the influence of structural embeddedness and social incentives in the analysis of harmful group conflict. The integrated model explains why intergroup conflicts are often promoted by segregation and describes conditions under which this effect does not occur. The model predicts that a relationship between segregation and the likelihood of conflict can be characterized by an S-shape function. The segregation effect is stronger if local selective incentives are relatively important compared to confirmation from neighbors. Results show that under certain structural conditions, rational individuals are more likely to be trapped in harmful conflict than less rational actors, and rigid assumptions about individual rationality strengthen the effect of clustering on intergroup conflict.

Suggested Citation

  • Károly Takács, 2001. "Structural Embeddedness and Intergroup Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(6), pages 743-769, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:45:y:2001:i:6:p:743-769
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002701045006003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Anthony R. Oberschall, 1994. "Rational Choice in Collective Protests," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(1), pages 79-100, January.
    4. Colin F. Camerer, 1997. "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 167-188, Fall.
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    Cited by:

    1. Groãÿer, Jens & Schram, Arthur, 2006. "Neighborhood Information Exchange and Voter Participation: An Experimental Study," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(2), pages 235-248, May.

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