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Advice and Consent

Author

Listed:
  • Patrick J. Haney

    (Miami University)

  • Roberta Q. Herzberg

    (Indiana University)

  • Rick K. Wilson

    (Rice University)

Abstract

This research explores two approaches to modeling decisions about when to resort to conflict. The authors begin from a model of a single actor making unilateral decisions for her or his nation-state. That model is expanded to incorporate advisors who make recommendations to the unitary actor. Those recommendations can be accepted or rejected as the leader sees fit. The authors' concern is to explore the robustness of the unitary actor model when others are added to the decision process. The authors rely on theoretical findings from social choice theory to develop the model. Laboratory experiments are then used to test the predictions from their model.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick J. Haney & Roberta Q. Herzberg & Rick K. Wilson, 1992. "Advice and Consent," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(4), pages 603-633, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:36:y:1992:i:4:p:603-633
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002792036004001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    8. Riker, William H., 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 432-446, June.
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