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Taking a side between the United States and the People’s Republic of China: Strategic hedging of South Korea and India

Author

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  • Wonjae Hwang
  • Hayoun Jessie Ryou-Ellison

Abstract

This paper explores how South Korea and India have taken positions between the United States and the People’s Republic of China over diverse foreign policy issues. By adopting dual engagement and strategic ambiguity as hedging strategies, both regional powers reduce their vulnerability to the influence and pressure of the two great powers. Thanks to their strategic importance and prominence in regional politics enhanced by such strategies, South Korea and India can independently pursue their foreign policy preferences to a great extent. The analysis of voting behavior of these regional powers in the United Nations General Assembly between 1991 and 2018 confirms our expectations.

Suggested Citation

  • Wonjae Hwang & Hayoun Jessie Ryou-Ellison, 2021. "Taking a side between the United States and the People’s Republic of China: Strategic hedging of South Korea and India," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 24(2), pages 60-78, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:intare:v:24:y:2021:i:2:p:60-78
    DOI: 10.1177/22338659211013650
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    References listed on IDEAS

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