IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/intare/v26y2023i1p55-70.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Health aid for states with dissimilar foreign policy preferences, a tool for peace?

Author

Listed:
  • Wonjae Hwang

    (4285University of Tennessee, USA)

  • Jeeseon Hwang

    (26725Seoul National University, Korea)

Abstract

Due to its exigency and humanitarian nature, health aid is less political and thus less vulnerable to domestic and international criticism than other types of foreign aid. Ironically, this makes health aid an effective policy tool for donors to cultivate or improve relations with recipients that have divergent foreign policy preferences from donors. This implies that health problems caused by pandemics/epidemics and associated health aid can create an opportunity to ameliorate historically troubled relationships between states. By examining the link between bilateral health aid flows and differences in foreign policy preferences between 24 donors and their recipients from 1990 to 2017, this paper presents findings that support this claim. The theoretical arguments and empirical findings of this paper offer novel insights into the politics of health aid.

Suggested Citation

  • Wonjae Hwang & Jeeseon Hwang, 2023. "Health aid for states with dissimilar foreign policy preferences, a tool for peace?," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 26(1), pages 55-70, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:intare:v:26:y:2023:i:1:p:55-70
    DOI: 10.1177/22338659231152402
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/22338659231152402
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/22338659231152402?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dursun Peksen, 2019. "When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(6), pages 635-647, September.
    2. Axel Dreher & Peter Nunnenkamp & Rainer Thiele, 2008. "Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 139-164, July.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Dollar, David, 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 33-63, March.
    4. David J. Lektzian & Christopher M. Sprecher, 2007. "Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(2), pages 415-431, April.
    5. Axel Dreher & Stephan Klasen & James Raymond Vreeland & Eric Werker, 2013. "The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective?," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(1), pages 157-191.
    6. Fleck, Robert K. & Kilby, Christopher, 2010. "Changing aid regimes? U.S. foreign aid from the Cold War to the War on Terror," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 185-197, March.
    7. Helen V. Milner & Dustin H. Tingley, 2010. "The Political Economy Of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators And The Domestic Politics Of Aid," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(2), pages 200-232, July.
    8. Douglas Gibler & Toby Rider, 2004. "Prior Commitments: Compatible Interests versus Capabilities in Alliance Behavior," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(4), pages 309-329, October.
    9. Dietrich, Simone, 2011. "The Politics of Public Health Aid: Why Corrupt Governments Have Incentives to Implement Aid Effectively," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 55-63, January.
    10. Tierney, Michael J. & Nielson, Daniel L. & Hawkins, Darren G. & Roberts, J. Timmons & Findley, Michael G. & Powers, Ryan M. & Parks, Bradley & Wilson, Sven E. & Hicks, Robert L., 2011. "More Dollars than Sense: Refining Our Knowledge of Development Finance Using AidData," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(11), pages 1891-1906.
    11. Nickell, Stephen J, 1981. "Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1417-1426, November.
    12. Boone, Peter, 1996. "Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 289-329, February.
    13. Collier, Paul & Dollar, David, 2002. "Aid allocation and poverty reduction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1475-1500, September.
    14. Esser, Daniel E. & Keating Bench, Kara, 2011. "Does Global Health Funding Respond to Recipients' Needs? Comparing Public and Private Donors' Allocations in 2005-2007," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 1271-1280, August.
    15. Wonjae Hwang & Amanda G. Sanford & Junhan Lee, 2015. "Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly?," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(2), pages 256-278, March.
    16. Bryan R. Early & Amira Jadoon, 2016. "Do Sanctions Always Stigmatize? The Effects of Economic Sanctions on Foreign Aid," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(2), pages 217-243, March.
    17. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno & Smith, Alastair, 2009. "A Political Economy of Aid," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 309-340, April.
    18. Ilyana Kuziemko & Eric Werker, 2006. "How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(5), pages 905-930, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Angelika J. Budjan & Andreas Fuchs, 2021. "Democracy and Aid Donorship," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 217-238, November.
    2. Juergen Bitzer & Erkan Goeren, 2018. "Foreign Aid and Subnational Development: A Grid Cell Analysis," Working Papers V-407-18, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2018.
    3. Huanhuan Zheng & Chen Li, 2022. "Can money buy friendship?—Evidence from the US and China’s competition for influence through foreign aid," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(10), pages 3224-3245, October.
    4. Asmus, Gerda & Eichenauer, Vera & Fuchs, Andreas & Parks, Bradley, 2021. "Does India use development finance to compete with China? A subnational analysis," Kiel Working Papers 2189, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    5. Brech, Viktor & Potrafke, Niklas, 2014. "Donor ideology and types of foreign aid," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 61-75.
    6. Axel Dreher & Valentin F. Lang & Sebastian Ziaja, 2017. "Foreign Aid in Areas of Limited Statehood," CESifo Working Paper Series 6340, CESifo.
    7. Acht, Martin & Omar Mahmoud, Toman & Thiele, Rainer, 2014. "Corrupt governments receive less bilateral aid: Governance and the delivery of foreign aid through non-government actors," Kiel Working Papers 1901, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    8. Minasyan, Anna, 2018. "US aid, US educated leaders and economic ideology," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 244-257.
    9. James Vreeland, 2011. "Foreign aid and global governance: Buying Bretton Woods – the Swiss-bloc case," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 369-391, September.
    10. Frot, Emmanuel & Olofsgård, Anders & Berlin, Maria Perrotta, 2014. "Aid Effectiveness in Times of Political Change: Lessons from the Post-Communist Transition," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 127-138.
    11. Anke Hoeffler & Verity Outram, 2008. "Need, Merit or Self-Interest - What Determines the Allocation of Aid?," Economics Series Working Papers CSAE WPS/2008-19, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    12. Axel Dreher & Andreas Fuchs, 2015. "Rogue aid? An empirical analysis of China's aid allocation," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(3), pages 988-1023, August.
    13. Yu Wang, 2013. "Veto Players and Foreign Aid Inflows," Oxford Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(3), pages 391-408, September.
    14. Kamguia, Brice & Tadadjeu, Sosson & Miamo, Clovis & Njangang, Henri, 2022. "Does foreign aid impede economic complexity in developing countries?," International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 71-88.
    15. World Bank, 2020. "Violence without Borders," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 33330, December.
    16. Gaibulloev, Khusrav & Younas, Javed, 2018. "Untying the motives of giving grants vs. loans," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 1-14.
    17. Stubbs, Thomas H. & Kentikelenis, Alexander E. & King, Lawrence P., 2016. "Catalyzing Aid? The IMF and Donor Behavior in Aid Allocation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 511-528.
    18. Ambrocio, Gene & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2021. "Quid pro quo? Political ties and sovereign borrowing," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    19. Masaki, Takaaki, 2016. "Coups d’État and Foreign Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 51-68.
    20. Redlin, Margarete & Gries, Thomas & Meierrieks, Daniel, 2014. "Oppressive Governments, US Closeness, and Anti-US Terrorism," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100588, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:intare:v:26:y:2023:i:1:p:55-70. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.hufs.ac.kr/user/hufsenglish/re_1.jsp .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.