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Firm life cycle and advisory directors

Author

Listed:
  • Ahsan Habib
  • Md. Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan

    (School of Accountancy, Massey University, Auckland, New Zealand)

  • Mostafa Monzur Hasan

Abstract

This article investigates whether the presence of advisory directors and monitoring directors varies across firm life cycle stages. We follow a parsimonious life cycle proxy based on the predicted behaviour of operating, investing and financing cash flows across the different life cycle stages that result from firm performance and the allocation of resources. Using an Australian sample, this study shows that compared to mature-stage firms, firms in the introduction, shake-out and decline stages have more advisory directors. With respect to the demand for monitoring directors, we find that compared to mature-stage firms, firms in the introduction, shake-out and decline stages have fewer monitoring directors on the board. We contribute to the literature on boards of directors by documenting that firms choose an optimal board structure based on their economic characteristics. JEL Classification: D22, G38, M14

Suggested Citation

  • Ahsan Habib & Md. Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan & Mostafa Monzur Hasan, 2018. "Firm life cycle and advisory directors," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 43(4), pages 575-592, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ausman:v:43:y:2018:i:4:p:575-592
    DOI: 10.1177/0312896217731502
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    1. Habib, Ahsan & Hasan, Mostafa Monzur, 2019. "Corporate life cycle research in accounting, finance and corporate governance: A survey, and directions for future research," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 188-201.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Advisory directors; Australia; firm life cycle; monitoring directors;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility

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