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Elecotral Systems and Corruption

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  • Verardi, Vincenzo

    (Independent)

Abstract

Recently, many scholars have tried to explain how electoral systems are linked to corruption. Several theories emerged but still no consensus has been reached. With a dataset of about 50 democratic countries considered over 10 years we try to understand which of the effects highlighted in the theoretical literature dominates. The results tend to show that larger voting districts (characterized by lower barriers to entry) are associated with less corruption, whereas closed lists tend to be associated with more The latter effect is nevertheless not robust. In aggregate, we find that majoritarian systems tend to be associated to higher levels of corruption than proportional representations. An additional finding is that presidential regimes tend to be associated with more corruption than parliamentary ones.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Instituto de Investigaciones Socio-Económicas (IISEC), Universidad Católica Boliviana in its journal Revista Latinoamericana de Desarrollo Economico.

Volume (Year): (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (Octubre)
Pages: 117-150

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Handle: RePEc:ris:revlde:0304

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Postal: Universidad católica Boliviana San Pablo, Instituto de Investigaciones Socio Económicas, Av. 14 de septiembre 4807. Obrajes, La Paz, Bolivia
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Keywords: Electoral; Systems; Corruption;

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  1. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-81, August.
  2. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
  3. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "The Quality of Government," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 1847, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  4. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202, November.
  5. Shang-Jin Wei, 1997. "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan 63, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  6. Myerson, Roger B., 1999. "Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 671-697, April.
  7. Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald, 1986. "A note on competitive bribery games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 337-341.
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