This paper shows one type of asymmetric information problems, their theoretical implications, the design of contracts that mitigate them, as well as some experimental evidence. Furthermore, by extrapolating the results, the paper tries to illustrate certain macroeconomic implications obtained under a controlled environment.
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Volume (Year): 6 (2004) Issue (Month): 10 (January-June) Pages: 47-69 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Find related papers by JEL classification: B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
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