Posiciones legales y complementariedades institucionales
AbstractLegal positions (such as rights, duties, liberties, powers, liabilities and immunities) are linked together by strong institutional complementarities that differ from the usual institutional complementarities that have been recently considered in economic literature. Legal positions not only satisfy the usual conditions of institutional complementarity stemming from the fact that legal positions that “fit” together are marginally better than those that do not. They also define legal equilibria characterized by the social scarcity constraint that is typical of positional goods.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía in its journal Revista de Economía Institucional.
Volume (Year): 5 (2003)
Issue (Month): 9 (July-December)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Cra. 1 No. 12-68 Casa de las Mandolinas
Phone: (571) 2826066 Ext. 1307
Fax: (571) 2826066 Ext. 1304
Web page: http://www.economiainstitucional.com
More information through EDIRC
legal positions; institutional complementarities; contracts; property law; industrial organization; capitalist systems;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
- P10 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
- Pagano, Ugo, 2000.
"Public markets, private orderings and corporate governance,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 453-477, December.
- Ugo Pagano, 2000. "Public Markets, Private Orderings and Corporate Governance," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp166, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
- repec:fth:diecpo:233 is not listed on IDEAS
- Pagano, U, 1983. "Profit Maximization, Industrial Democracy and the Allocation of Labour," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 51(2), pages 159-83, June.
- Ugo Pagano, 1999. "The Origin of Organizational Species," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp118, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
- Pagano, Ugo & Rowthorn, Robert, 1994. "Ownership, technology and institutional stability," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 221-242, December.
- Geoffrey M. Hodgson, 1998. "The Approach of Institutional Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 166-192, March.
- Luca Fiorito, 2008. "John R. Commons, Wesley N. Hohfeld and the Origins of Transactional Economics," Department of Economics University of Siena 536, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paola Rodríguez).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.