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About Market Structure

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Author Info
Klaus Kultti (University of Helsinki)

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Abstract

I study an economy where sellers choose locations, and buyers choose which location to visit. All sellers in one location correspond to the Walrasian market while each seller in a separate location corresponds to the standard random matching model. Trades are consummated in auctions, and it turns out that the Walrasian market is not an equilibrium market structure. Rather, the sellers choose to distribute themselves in several locations endogenously creating the imperfectness of markets. I determine the number of sellers per location in equilibrium as a function of the ratio of buyers to sellers. (Copyright: Elsevier)

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1094-2025(02)00016-9
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.

Volume (Year): 6 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 240-251
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Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:6:y:2003:i:1:p:240-251

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Related research
Keywords: Market structure; Matching; Auctions;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Kultti, Klaus, 1999. "Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 106-113, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Ricardo Lagos, 2000. "An Alternative Approach to Search Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 851-873, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Herreiner, Dorothea K, 1999. "The Decision to Seek or to Be Sought," Discussion Paper Serie B 462, University of Bonn, Germany.
  4. Melvyn G. Coles & Jan Eeckhout, 2000. "Heterogeneity as a Coordination Device," Economics Working Papers 510, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  5. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1993. "A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 63-77, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Michael Peters, 1999. "Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 273-292. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Diamond, Peter, 1990. "Pairwise Credit in Search Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 285-319, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Burdett, Ken & Coles, Melvyn G, 1997. "Marriage and Class," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 141-68, February.
  9. Lu, Xiaohua & McAfee, R. Preston, 1996. "The Evolutionary Stability of Auctions over Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 228-254, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-24.

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