About Market Structure
AbstractI study an economy where sellers choose locations, and buyers choose which location to visit. All sellers in one location correspond to the Walrasian market while each seller in a separate location corresponds to the standard random matching model. Trades are consummated in auctions, and it turns out that the Walrasian market is not an equilibrium market structure. Rather, the sellers choose to distribute themselves in several locations endogenously creating the imperfectness of markets. I determine the number of sellers per location in equilibrium as a function of the ratio of buyers to sellers. (Copyright: Elsevier)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.
Volume (Year): 6 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Postal: Review of Economic Dynamics Academic Press Editorial Office 525 "B" Street, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
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