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Multilateral and Bilateral Meetings with Production Heterogeneity

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  • Klaus Kultti

    (Department of Economics, University of Helsinki, Finland)

  • Toni Riipinen

    (LTT Research Ltd, Finland)

Abstract

We study different trading processes in the context of a search-based model of endogenous money. We incorporate heterogeneity into the model by allowing multiple meetings of agents and divisible production. We then determine the equilibrium using three different trading mechanisms: auctions, pairwise bargaining and price posting. The welfare under these mechanisms is compared using specific functional forms for utility and cost functions. The analysis is done numerically with the bench mark of a social welfare maximising planner.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Finnish Economic Association in its journal Finnish Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 16 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 27-37

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Handle: RePEc:fep:journl:v:16:y:2003:i:1:p:27-37

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Web page: http://www.taloustieteellinenyhdistys.fi
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  1. Jansen, Marcel, 2010. "Job auctions and hold-ups," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 608-619, June.
  2. Lu, Xiaohua & McAfee, R. Preston, 1996. "The Evolutionary Stability of Auctions over Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 228-254, August.
  3. Peters, Michael, 1992. "On the Efficiency of Ex Ante and Ex Post Pricing Institutions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 85-101, January.
  4. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1993. "A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 63-77, March.
  5. Trejos, Alberto & Wright, Randall, 1995. "Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 118-41, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Richard Dutu & Benoit Julien & Ian King, 2009. "Liquidity Constrained Competing Auctions," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1068, The University of Melbourne.
  2. Halko, Marja-Liisa & Kultti, Klaus & Niinimaki, Juha-Pekka, 2007. "Evolutionary stability of trading rules in an urn-ball matching model," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 11-15, March.

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