IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/recoru/ecoru_0013-0559_1985_num_170_1_3205.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Les marchés au cadran et la formation des prix

Author

Listed:
  • Florence Naegelen

Abstract

[eng] Dutch type auctions, used to sell fruits and vegetables, are special resources allocation procedures. In this article, we study the mechanism properties through the bidding theory methods. The Dutch auction is often preferred to other allocation procedures for several reasons: it's an efficient and very fast revelation mechanism, which is fair. A game theory analysis is used to study the Dutch auction prices properties. The decreasing auction is a non cooperative game which is strategically equivalent to the first priGe auction. The price formed, depending on the buyers' strategies, is a competitive price which tends to the true price when buyers become more risk averse and when competition increases. [fre] Les marchés au cadran, utilisés pour la vente de fruits et légumes, sont des procédures spécifiques d'allocation des biens. Cet article est consacré à la détermination des propriétés de ces mécanismes à partir de la théorie des enchères. L'enchère décroissante se révèle pour certains produits supérieure aux autres procédures de mise sur le marché pour plusieurs raisons: c'est un mécanisme efficace de révélation des disponibilités marginales à payer des acheteurs, qui est équitable et permet une formation des prix très rapide. La mise en évidence des propriétés des prix dans l'enchère décroissante nécessite une analyse en terme de théorie des jeux. Cette procédure peut en effet être considérée comme un jeu non coopératif qui s'analyse de la même façon que l'appel d'offres au premier prix. Le prix qui émerge, dépendant de la stratégie des acheteurs, est un prix de nature concurrentielle, d'autant plus proche du vrai prix que l'aversion des agents pour le risque est grande et que la concurrence est intense.

Suggested Citation

  • Florence Naegelen, 1985. "Les marchés au cadran et la formation des prix," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 170(1), pages 46-50.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recoru:ecoru_0013-0559_1985_num_170_1_3205
    DOI: 10.3406/ecoru.1985.3205
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecoru.1985.3205
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3406/ecoru.1985.3205
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/ecoru_0013-0559_1985_num_170_1_3205
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3406/ecoru.1985.3205?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    2. G. Opstelten, 1985. "L'organisation des producteurs et des marchés de fruits et légumes aux Pays-Bas : les "veilings" (marchés au cadran)," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 165(1), pages 18-20.
    3. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
    4. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    5. F. Lauret & J.-F. Soufflet, 1985. "Les marchés physiques et l'organisation des marchés," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 165(1), pages 3-11.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Malueg, David A. & Orzach, Ram, 2009. "Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: Two examples," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 177-180, November.
    2. Hu, Audrey & Offerman, Theo & Zou, Liang, 2011. "Premium auctions and risk preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2420-2439.
    3. Matthews, Steven, 1987. "Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 633-646, May.
    4. Christopher Boyer & B. Brorsen, 2014. "Implications of a Reserve Price in an Agent-Based Common-Value Auction," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 43(1), pages 33-51, January.
    5. Syngjoo Choi & Lars Nesheim & Imran Rasul, 2016. "Reserve Price Effects In Auctions: Estimates From Multiple Regression-Discontinuity Designs," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(1), pages 294-314, January.
    6. Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000391, UCLA Department of Economics.
    7. Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2005. "Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 936-959, September.
    8. Paarsch, Harry J., 1997. "Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 333-357, June.
    9. Lebrun, Bernard, 1998. "Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 97-110, October.
    10. Ernan Haruvy & Peter Popkowski Leszczyc & Octavian Carare & James Cox & Eric Greenleaf & Wolfgang Jank & Sandy Jap & Young-Hoon Park & Michael Rothkopf, 2008. "Competition between auctions," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 431-448, December.
    11. Michel Mougeot & Pierre Malgrange, 2002. "Présentation générale," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 156(5), pages 1-7.
    12. Hu, Youxin & Kagel, John & Xu, Xiaoshu & Ye, Lixin, 2013. "Theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 269-291.
    13. Yonghong Long, 2009. "Bidders¡¯ Risk Preferences in Discriminative Auctions," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 10(1), pages 215-223, May.
    14. Florens, Jean-Pierre & Hugo, Marie-Anne & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1997. "Game theory econometric models: application to procurements in the space industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 951-959, April.
    15. Matthew J. Clayton & S. Abraham Ravid, 1999. "The Effect of Leverage on Bidding Behavior: Theory and Evidence from the FCC Auctions," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-055, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
    16. Nicolas Gruyer, 2005. "Using lotteries in auctions when buyers collude," Economics Working Papers 02, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school).
    17. Hanming Fang & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 9, pages 319-356, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    18. Péter Esö & Lucy White, 2004. "Precautionary Bidding in Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(1), pages 77-92, January.
    19. Wayne-Roy Gayle, 2005. "Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 472, Society for Computational Economics.
    20. Cox, James C. & Sadiraj, Vjollca, 2006. "Small- and large-stakes risk aversion: Implications of concavity calibration for decision theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 45-60, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:recoru:ecoru_0013-0559_1985_num_170_1_3205. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/ecoru .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.