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Quel scénario pour le gouvernement d’entreprise ? Une hypothèse de double convergence

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  • Dominique Plihon
  • Jean-Pierre Ponssard
  • Philippe Zarlowski

Abstract

[fre] L’évolution du modèle de gouvernement d’entreprise donne lieu à un affrontement entre deux thèses opposées. Pour certains, les modèles nationaux vont continuer d’exister, tandis que, pour d’autres, il y aurait un processus de convergence vers un modèle unique, d’inspiration anglo-saxonne. Cet article met en évidence l’hypothèse d’un processus de convergence plutôt que d’alignement. Celle-ci emprunterait aux modèles dit de shareholder et de stakeholder. Ainsi, les auteurs décrivent, d’une part, le rééquilibrage du rapport de forces entre dirigeants et actionnaires en faveur de ces derniers. D’autre part, ils montrent la pluralité croissante des objectifs de l’entreprise, les enjeux éthiques et environnementaux accompagnant de plus en plus la prise en compte de la maximisation de la valeur actionnariale. . Classification JEL : G23, G30, L20, D23 [eng] Do Corporate Governance Models Converge ? . Concerning the development of the corporate governance model, two thesis are studied. On the first hand, national models will exist for a long time. On the second hand, these national models would converge on a unique Anglo-Saxon model. This article defends the thesis of convergence which results from both shareholder and stakeholder models. The authors explain the new relationship between firm managers and strong shareholders. Moreover, in their decision-making process, firms now take care of ethical and environmental goals. . JEL classifications : G23, G30, L20, D23

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Plihon & Jean-Pierre Ponssard & Philippe Zarlowski, 2001. "Quel scénario pour le gouvernement d’entreprise ? Une hypothèse de double convergence," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 63(3), pages 35-51.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2001_num_63_3_3667
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2001.3667
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2001.3667
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
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    3. Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 1997. "Concurrence internationale, croissance et emploi," Post-Print hal-00363899, HAL.
    4. Roe, Mark J., 1990. "Political and legal restraints on ownership and control of public companies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 7-41, September.
    5. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gérard Hirigoyen & Thierry Poulain-Rehm, 2017. "Comparative approach of governance models: an empirical study [Approche comparative des modèles de gouvernance : Une étude empirique]," Post-Print hal-02521878, HAL.
    2. Dhafer Saïdane, 2005. "La convergence vers le « Market based system » : une vue de l’esprit ?," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 81(4), pages 61-82.
    3. François MORIN (LEREPS-GRES), 2006. "The Capitalism of financial market and the control of cognitive (In French)," Cahiers du GRES (2002-2009) 2006-05, Groupement de Recherches Economiques et Sociales.
    4. Wladimir Andreff, 2003. "Le gouvernement d’entreprise à l’Est : vers un modèle de contrôle centre-européen ?," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 72(3), pages 173-199.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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