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Sélection de clientèle et exclusion bancaire

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  • Nicolas Eber

Abstract

[fre] Pour toutes les banques, la sélection de la clientèle est un problème crucial. Il s’agit de déterminer quels clients doivent être servis et quels clients doivent être rationnés ou exclus. Pour cela, il convient de trouver des méthodes permettant une telle sélection. Au plan théorique, la question est de comprendre les origines et les enjeux du problème de la sélection de clientèle. D’une manière évidente, l’origine fondamentale du problème réside dans l’imperfection de l’information concernant le risque des clients. Bien entendu, l’information imparfaite rend difficile pour la banque d’évaluer avec exactitude le risque d’un client et rend donc complexe la procédure de sélection des clients acceptables. . Classification JEL : D82 [eng] Selection and exclusion in the banking sector . For any bank, the crucial point is to discriminate the « good » customer from the « bad ». Thus the need for systematic method to discriminate. This discrimination is made difficult due to the existence of information asymetries. . JEL Classification : D82

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Eber, 2000. "Sélection de clientèle et exclusion bancaire," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 58(3), pages 79-96.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2000_num_58_3_3482
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2000.3482
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2000.3482
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    Cited by:

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    2. Mawuli Kodjovi Couchoro, 2019. "La place des mecanismes d’epargne-credit et de pret progressif dans la selection des clients des IMF en milieu urbain : le cas de WAGES en 2010," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 31(2), pages 314-331, April.
    3. SECK, Massamba Souleymane, 2019. "Complémentarité Banque islamique du Sénégal/institutions de microfinance : un modèle de financement inclusif et durable des PME sénégalaises [Complementarity Islamic Bank of Senegal/microfinance in," MPRA Paper 92190, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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