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Retraite, préretraite, neutralité actuarielle et couverture du risque de chômage en fin de carrière

Author

Listed:
  • Didier Blanchet
  • Cécile Brousse
  • Mahrez Okba

Abstract

[eng] Retirement, Early Retirement, Non-Discriminatory Actuarial Evaluation and the Coverage of the Unemployment Risk at the End of a Career . The study of retirement and early retirement provides a good opportunity to qualify the frequent differentiation between the insurance and redistributive functions of social security. It is fairly common practice to save the term "insurance" for pension systems that make no interpersonal ex-post redistribution other than that induced by the random differences in age at death. Such systems satisfy the principle of non-discriminatory actuarial evaluation, which implies in particular that an individual taking retirement earlier than the norm must make up for his longer retirement and shorter contribution period by taking a lower annual pension. Yet this principle is clearly shown to be erroneous by a study of the overall effects of the retirement/early retirement relation. This is because the individuals taking early retirement benefit from a "redistribution" indirectly financed by the individuals who retire at the normal age. . Does this mean that early retirement does not fulfil an insurance role? The answer is obviously negative as this early retirement covers a specific risk; that of early exclusion from the labour market. With this function clarified, a detailed study needs to be made of the conditions in which it is fulfilled, especially from a comparative point of view. [fre] Retraite, préretraite, neutralité actuarielle et couverture du risque de chômage en fin de carrière . L'étude de la retraite et de la préretraite fournit une bonne occasion de nuancer l'opposition habituelle entre fonctions d'assurance et fonctions redistributives de la protection sociale. Un certain usage voudrait qu'on réserve le qualificatif d'assurantiels à des systèmes de retraite qui n'opèrent aucune redistribution interpersonnelles ex post autre que celle qui est induite par les différences aléatoires d'âge au décès. De tels systèmes satisfont un principe de neutralité actuarielle qui implique, en particulier, qu'un individu partant en retraite plus tôt que la moyenne doit compenser sa durée de retraite plus longue et sa durée de cotisation plus courte par un flux annuel de pension plus réduit. Or ce principe est clairement mis en . défaut lorsqu'on s'intéresse aux effets globaux du couple retraite-préretraite puisque les individus à qui la préretraite permet un départ précoce bénéficient d'une « redistribution », indirectement financée par les individus qui partent en retraite à l'âge normal. . Faut-il en conclure que la préretraite ne remplit pas un rôle d'assurance ? La réponse est évidemment négative, puisque cette préretraite sert bien à couvrir un risque particulier, celui d'une exclusion anticipée du marché du travail. Cette fonction étant précisée, il reste à examiner en détail les conditions dans lesquelles elle est remplie, et notamment dans une perspective comparative. [spa] Jubilaciôn, prejubilaciôn, neutralidad actuarial y cobertura del riesgo de paro en fin de carrera . El estudio de la jubilaciôn y de la prejubilaciôn proporciona una buena oportunidad para matizar la consabida oposiciôn entre funciones de seguro y funciones redistributivas de la protecciôn social. Segûn cierto uso, se suele mâs bien reservar el calificativo de aseguramental a unos sistemas de jubilaciôn que no realizan ninguna redistribuciôn interpersonal ex post excepto la que se induce de las diferencias aleatorias de edad de defunciôn. Semejantes sistemas satisfacen un principio de neutralidad actuarial que implica, en especial, el que un individuo que se jubila antes que la media deba compensar la duration mâs larga de su jubilaciôn y la duration mâs coda de su cotizaciôn por un flujo anual de pension mâs reducido. Ahora bien, este principio cae en falta si nos interesamos por los efectos globales de la . pareja jubilaciôn-prejubilaciôn ya que aquellos individuos a los que la prejubilaciôn les permite una salida precoz se benefician de una "redistribuciôn", financiada indirectamente por los individuos que se retiran a la edad normal. . i,Debemos concluir de aquello que la prejubilaciôn no desempena un papel de seguro? La respuesta es evidentemente negativa, puesto que esta prejubilaciôn sf sirve para cubrir un riesgo en particular, el de una exclusion anticipada del mercado laboral. Ya definida esta funciôn, queda por examinar en sus pormenores las condiciones segûn las que se desempena, y siguiendo un enfoque comparativo. [ger] Ruhestand, Fruhverrentung, versicherungsmathematische Neutralitat und Absicherung des Arbeitslosigkeitsrisikos am Ende des Berufslebens . Eine Untersuchung uber den Ruhestand und die Fruhverrentung bietet eine gute Gelegenheit, um den ubiichen Gegensatz zwischen der Versicherungs- und der Umverteilungsfunktion der Sozialversicherung in einem neuen Lichte zu sehen. Einer bestimmten Tradition zufolge sollte die Bezeichnung "Versicherung" Rentensystemen vorbehalten bleiben, die au(3er bei den aleatorischen Altersunterschieden beim Tode keinerlei Ex-posf-Umverteilung zwischen den Personen vomehmen. Solche Système erfûllen einen versicherungsmathe- matischen Neutralitàtsgrundsatz, der insbesondere zur Folge hat, daft ein Individuum, das frûher als der Durchschnitt in den Ruhestand geht, die lângere Dauer seines Ruhestandes und die kurzere Dauer seiner Beitragszahlung durch eine geringere Jahresrente ausgleichen mufl. Bei nàherer Untersuchung derglobalen Effekte des Begriffspaares Ruhestand/Fruhverrentung . wird jedoch die Nichterfullung dieses Grundsatzes klar aufgezeigt, da den Individuen, denen der Vorruhestand ein vorzeitiges Ausscheiden aus dem Berufsleben ermôglicht, eine "Umverteilung" zugute kommt, die von den Individuen, die erst bei Erreichung des gesetzlichen Rentenalters in den Ruhestand gehen, indirekt finanziert wird. . 1st daraus zu schlieBen, daB die Fruhverrentung die Versicherungsfunktion nicht erfùllt? Selbstverstândlich fàllt die Antwort negativ aus, da diese Fruhverrentung zur Absicherung eines besonderen Risikos dient, und zwar desjenigen des vorzeitigen Ausschlusses vom Arbeitsmarkt. Nach Pràzisierung dieser Funktion sind noch die Bedingungen, unter denen sie erfûllt wird, im einzelnen zu prufen, insbesondere in einer komparativen Perspektive.

Suggested Citation

  • Didier Blanchet & Cécile Brousse & Mahrez Okba, 1996. "Retraite, préretraite, neutralité actuarielle et couverture du risque de chômage en fin de carrière," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 291(1), pages 203-218.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1996_num_291_1_6040
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.1996.6040
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.1996.6040
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-1284, December.
    2. Didier Blanchet, 1995. "Equité, efficacité et fonctions assurantielles de la retraite et de la préretraite," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(3), pages 993-1002.
    3. Bodie, Zvi, 1990. "Pensions as Retirement Income Insurance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 28(1), pages 28-49, March.
    4. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1986. " Payroll-Tax Financed Social Insurance with Variable Retirement," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 88(1), pages 25-50.
    5. Diamond, P. A. & Mirrlees, J. A., 1978. "A model of social insurance with variable retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 295-336, December.
    6. Johnson,Paul & Zimmermann,Klaus F. (ed.), 1993. "Labour Markets in an Ageing Europe," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521443982.
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    1. Antoine Bozio & Simon Rabaté & Audrey Rain & Maxime To, 2019. "Quelles règles de pilotage pour un système de retraite à rendement défini?," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02514738, HAL.
    2. Disney, Richard & Whitehouse, Edward, 1999. "Pension plans and retirement incentives," Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 20851, The World Bank.
    3. Patrick Aubert & Didier Blanchet, 2011. "Les retraites : solidarité, contributivité et comportements de liquidation," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 441(1), pages 3-14.

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