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La référence assurantielle en matière de protection sociale : apports et limites

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  • Didier Blanchet

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[ger] Das Versicherungsprinzip bei der sozialen . Die Beziehungen zwischen den Begriffen sozialer Schutz und Versicherung sind vieldeutig und mitunter sogar widersprûchlich. Man stellt zunâchst fest, dafB bei den Ùberlegungen ùber die soziale Sicherung weitgehend auf den Begriff des Risikos zurùckgegriffen wird, was den SchluB nahelegt, daft der sozialen Sicherung eine Versicherungsaufgabe zukommt. Es sei ebenfalls daran erinnert, dafî dièse versicherungsbezogene Ausrichtung der Sozialversicherung einen wesentlichen Faktor bei deren Grûndung darstellte und daB ihre Trâger manchmal eine gewisse Neubesinnung auf dièse Aufgabe wûnschen. Doch werden bei dieser Forderung nie bestimmte nicht-versicherungsbezogene Merkmale des Systems in Frage gestellt, wie beispielsweise die verschiedenen Umverteilungsformen, die die Finanzierung der Krankenversicherung mit sich bringt. Der Versicherungsbezug wird auBerdem heftig abgelehnt, wenn er eine Gefahr des Abgleitens hin zu Verwaltungs- praktiken in sich birgt, die fur die private Versicherung kennzeichnend sind. . Sicherung: Nutzen und Grenzen Dies erfordert mehrere Klarstellungen. Zunâchst muB auf die Definition des Versicherungsbegriffes eingegangen werden, der entweder die allgemeine Funktion der Risikodeckung oder eine besondere Art der Absicherung bezeichnet, die von privaten Trâgern angeboten werden kann. Danach werden die Verwaltungsregeln ermittelt, die das wettbewerbliche Umfeld letzteren auferlegt: versi- cherungsmathematische Neutralitât, Vorfinanzierung, Risikoûberwachung und Risikoselektion. Die Frage, die sich unter diesen Umstânden hinsichtlich des Versicherungsbezugs stellt, wùrde dann lauten, inwiefern sich die Sozialversicherung dieser Regeln entziehen kann. Dies kann nach vier Kriterien diskutiert werden: dem Erfordernis der Korrektur von Ungleichheiten; der Notwendigkeit eines môglichst umfassenden Schutzes; der Notwendigkeit, die anreizhemmenden Effekte oder Effekte des "moral hazard" zu vermeiden, die jeder Transfermechanismus mit sich bringen kann; sowie schlieBlich der Notwendigkeit, die soziale Unterstûtzung aufrechtzuerhalten, die fur den Fortbestand des Systems Voraussetzung ist. [fre] La référence assurantielle en matière de protection sociale : apports et limites . La réflexion sur la protection sociale entretient avec la notion d'assurance des rapports ambigus et parfois même contradictoires. On note d'abord que cette réflexion fait un large usage de la notion de risque, ce qui suggère bien que la protection sociale remplit un rôle d'assurance. On se rappelle aussi que cette vocation assurantielle de la Sécurité sociale avait été fortement mise en avant lors de sa création et qu'un certain recentrage sur cette vocation est parfois souhaité par ses gestionnaires. Mais cette demande de recentrage ne va jamais jusqu'à remettre en cause certains caractères dits non assurantiels du système, tels que les différentes formes de redistribution impliquées par les modalités de financement de l'assurance-maladie. Et la référence assurantielle est récusée avec vigueur lorsqu'elle suggère un risque de dérive vers des modes de gestion caractérisant l'assurance privée. . Ceci invite à plusieurs clarifications. D'abord à revenir sur la définition de ce que recouvre le terme d'assurance, qui caractérise soit la fonction générale de couverture de risques, soit le type particulier de couverture qui peut être proposé par des opérateurs privés. On précise alors quelles sont les règles de gestion que le contexte concurrentiel impose à ces derniers : neutralité actuarielle, préfinancement, contrôle et sélection des risques. La question de la référence assurantielle, dans ces conditions, serait de savoir jusqu'à quel point l'assurance sociale peut s'affranchir de ces règles, ce qui peut être discuté en fonction de quatre critères : le besoin de correction des inégalités, le besoin d'une couverture aussi extensive que possible, la nécessité d'éviter les effets désincitatifs ou de risque moral qui peuvent être induits par tout mécanisme de transfert, et enfin celle de conserver le soutien social qui est nécessaire à la pérennité du système. [eng] The Social Security Insurance Reference: Advantages and Limits . Social security reasoning cultivates ambiguous and sometimes even contradictory relations with the notion of insurance. First of all, this thinking draws extensively on the notion of risk, which clearly suggests that social security fulfils an insurance role. In addition, the insurance aspect of social security was strongly emphasized when it was created and its administrators sometimes advocate a certain refocusing on this role. Yet this call for refocusing never goes so far as to question some of the non- insurance characteristics of the system, such as the different forms of redistribution implicit in health insurance funding methods. Moreover, the insurance reference raises strong objections when it suggests a risk of a drift towards management methods characteristic of private insurance. . Some clarification is called for here. First of all, we look at the definition of the term "insurance", which covers either the general function of risk coverage or the particular type of coverage that could be proposed by private operators. Then we detail the management rules that the competitive climate imposes on these private operators: non- discriminatory actuarial evaluation, advance funding, control and selection of risks. Given these circumstances, the insurance reference question consists of knowing to what extent social security can circumvent these rules. This can be discussed on the basis of four criteria: the need to correct inequalities, the need for as extensive a coverage as possible, the need to avoid disincentive effects or moral hazards apt to be induced by any transfer mechanism, and the need to maintain the social support necessary for the sustainability of the system. [spa] La referenda al seguro en cuanto a protecciôn social : aportaciones y limites . La reflexion sobre protecciôn social establece con la nociôn de seguro unas relaciones ambiguas, y hasta contradictorias. Es de notar que esta reflexion se vale con frecuencia de la nociôn de riesgo, lo cual da a entender que la protecciôn social desempena una funciôn de seguro. También es de recordar que la vocaciôn a asegurar de la Seguridad social habi'a prevalecido en su creaciôn, y que sus gerentes a veces desean que se vuelva a afirmar dicha vocaciôn. Sin embargo, tal deseo de reafirmaciôn no alcanza a poner en entredicho ciertos aspectos no aseguramentales del sistema, tales como las diferentes formas de redistribuciôn relacionadas con las modalidades de financiaciôn del seguro médico. Y s e descarta rotundamente la referenda al seguro, cuando esta implica un riesgo de dériva hacia unos modos de gestion que caracterizan el sector asegurador privado. . Se precisan por ello ciertas aclaraciones : primera hay que volver a la definition de lo que se entiende por el término de seguro, el cual caracteriza o bien la funciôn general de cobertura de riesgos o bien un tipo especial de cobertura que pueden brindar unos operadores privados. Se especifican entonces las reglas de gestion a las que les somete el contexte competencial : neutralidad actuarial, prefinanciaciôn, control y selecciôn de los riesgos. La cuestiôn de la referenda al seguro consistirfa en este caso en saber hasta que punto el seguro social puede prescindir de estas reglas, lo cual puede plantearse en funciôn de los siguientes cuatro criterios : la necesidad de correction de las desigualdades, la necesidad de una cobertura lo mâs extensa posible, la de evitar los efectos desincitativos o de riesgo moral que se inducen de cualquier mecanismo de transferencia, y en fin la de preservar el apoyo social necesario para la perennidad del sistema.

Suggested Citation

  • Didier Blanchet, 1996. "La référence assurantielle en matière de protection sociale : apports et limites," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 291(1), pages 33-45.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1996_num_291_1_6027
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.1996.6027
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.1996.6027
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Touzé, 2009. "Incidence fiscale des retraites par répartition," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03460023, HAL.
    2. Stéphane Jacobzone, 1997. "Systèmes mixtes d'assurance maladie, équité, gestion du risque et maîtrise des coûts," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 129(3), pages 189-205.
    3. Frédéric Zumer, 1998. "Stabilisation et redistribution budgétaires entre régions : État centralisé, État fédéral," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/766, Sciences Po.
    4. Antoine Math, 1996. "La notion de sélectivité d'une prestation et ses mesures," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 122(1), pages 1-11.
    5. Vincent Touzé, 2009. "Incidence fiscale des retraites par répartition. Une exploration analytique," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(4), pages 103-124.
    6. Catherine Pollak, 2009. "L'impossible approche positive des risques sociaux?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00422389, HAL.
    7. Olivier Davanne & Thierry Pujol, 1997. "Le Débat sur les Retraites : Capitalisation contre Répartition," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 12(1), pages 57-116.
    8. Vincent Touzé, 2009. "Incidence fiscale des retraites par répartition," Post-Print hal-03460023, HAL.
    9. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/766 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Mireille Elbaum, 2011. "Le financement de la protection sociale : quelles perspectives au-delà des solutions miracles," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2011-27, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    11. Nagy, András, 1998. "A jóléti rendszer Franciaországban [The welfare system in France]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(5), pages 456-478.
    12. Pierre Ralle & Carole Bonnet & Christel Colin, 2002. "Les formes de solidarité dans le système actuel de retraite," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 68(4), pages 113-136.
    13. Frédéric Zumer, 1998. "Stabilisation et redistribution budgétaires entre régions : État centralisé, État fédéral," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 65(1), pages 243-289.
    14. Dominique Bureau, 1999. "Intérêt social et discrimination en assurance-maladie publique," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 14(2), pages 163-187.
    15. Catherine Bac & Samia Benallah, 2016. "Glissement de la norme de contributivité au régime général d'assurance-vieillesse : une estimation des effets potentiels sur le niveau des pensions," Post-Print hal-02968979, HAL.
    16. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09hai241102 is not listed on IDEAS

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