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Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing

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Author Info
Mikhail Golosov
Aleh Tsyvinski

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Abstract

The paper analyzes an implementation of an optimal disability insurance system as a competitive equilibrium with taxes. The problem is modeled as a dynamic mechanism design problem in which disability is unobservable. We show that an asset-tested disability system in which a disability transfer is paid only if an agent has assets below a specified maximum implements the optimum. The logic behind the result is as follows: we show that an agent who falsely claims disability has higher savings than a truly disabled agent, and an asset test prevents false claimants from receiving disability. We also evaluate welfare benefits of asset testing. For a calibrated economy, we numerically compare the optimal system to the best system without asset testing. We find that gains of asset testing are significant and equal to about 0.65% of consumption.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10792.

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Date of creation: Sep 2004
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10792

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  5. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2003. "Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000426, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Bound, John & Burkhauser, Richard V., 1999. "Economic analysis of transfer programs targeted on people with disabilities," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 51, pages 3417-3528 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Emmanuel Saez, 2002. "Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 1039-1073, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2003. "Designing Optimal Disability Insurance," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000217, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  17. P. A. Diamond & J. A. Mirrlees, 1977. "A Model of Social Insurance With Variable Retirement," Working papers 210, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  20. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1986. " Payroll-Tax Financed Social Insurance with Variable Retirement," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 88(1), pages 25-50.
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  22. Tsyvinski, A. & Golosov, M., 2004. "Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Insurance Markets," 2004 Meeting Papers 124, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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  24. Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen, 1996. "Unemployment insurance with moral hazard in a dynamic economy," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Pestieau, Pierre, 2006. "Social Security and Retirement Decision: A Positive and Normative Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5542, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Narayana Kocherlakota & Borys Grochulski, 2007. "Nonseparable Preferences and Optimal Social Security Systems," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000156, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Mark Huggett (Georgetown University) and Juan Carlos Parra (Georgetown University), . "Quantifying the Inefficiency of the US Social Insurance System," Working Papers gueconwpa~05-05-16, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Stefania Albanesi, 2006. "Optimal Taxation of Entrepreneurial Capital with Private Information," NBER Working Papers 12419, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Mark Huggett & Juan Carols Parra, . "How Well Does the US Social Insurance System Provide Social Insurance?," Working Papers gueconwpa~06-06-11, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. J. C. Parra & M. Huggett, 2005. "Quantifying the Inefficiency of the US Social Security System," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 70, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Holen , Dag S., 2007. "Disabillity Pension Motivated Income Adjustment," Memorandum 17/2008, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Borys Grochulski, 2008. "Optimal personal bankruptcy design : A Mirrlees approach," Working Paper 08-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
  9. Steven P. Cassou & Arantza Gorostiaga, 2007. "Optimal fiscal policy in a multisector model with minimum expenditure requirements," DFAEII Working Papers 200701, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II. [Downloadable!]
  10. Stefania Albanesi & Roc Armenter, 2007. "Intertemporal Distortions in the Second Best," Discussion Papers 0708-08, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Borys Grochulski, 2008. "Limits to redistribution and intertemporal wedges : implications of Pareto optimality with private information," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 173-196. [Downloadable!]
  12. Pontus Rendahl, 2007. "Asset Based Unemployment Insurance," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/15, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  13. Noah Williams, 2008. "Persistent Private Information," NBER Working Papers 13894, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Niku Määttänen & Panu Poutvaara, 2006. "Should Old-age Benefits Be Earnings-tested," Discussion Papers 1062, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Marco Bassetto & Christopher Phelan, 2006. "Tax riots," Working Paper Series WP-06-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. David Autor & Mark Duggan, 2006. "The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding," NBER Working Papers 12436, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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