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Un modèle d'enchères de bois sur pied

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  • Patrice Loisel
  • Bernard Elyakime

Abstract

[fre] Un modèle d'enchères de bois sur pied par Bernard Elyakime et Patrice Loisel . Les bois sur pied sont souvent vendus en France par enchères avec prix de retrait secret dans lesquelles le produit est mal défini quant à son volume. Nous étudions un modèle en valeur privée indépendante avec un volume de bois estimé différemment par les acheteurs et le vendeur, en prix de retrait public puis secret. Nous déterminons les stratégies des acheteurs et vendeur pour calculer l'espérance d'utilité du vendeur dans chacun des modèles. Celle du modèle à prix de retrait secret est alors supérieure à celle du modèle à prix de retrait public sous certaines conditions de marché. [eng] Modelling Standing Timber Auctions by Bernard Elyakime and Patrice Loisel . In France, standing timber is often sold by auction with a secret reservation price and vaguely defined quantities. We propose two models in which there is an independent private value and different buyers' and sellers' estimates of quantities: one with a known reservation price and then one with a secret reservation price. We study the buyers' and sellers' strategies for working out the seller's expected revenues with and without a secret reserve price. The seller does better in an auction with a secret reservation price under certain market conditions.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/ecop.1998.5902
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File URL: http://www.persee.fr/articleAsPDF/ecop_0249-4744_1998_num_132_1_5902/ecop_0249-4744_1998_num_132_1_5902.pdf?mode=light
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

Volume (Year): 132 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 93-101

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Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1998_num_132_1_5902

Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1998.5902
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Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/ecop

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References

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  1. Patrice Loisel & Bernard Elyakime, 1997. "Asymétrie dans des enchères à prix de retrait secret," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(4), pages 835-851.
  2. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
  3. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
  4. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June.
  5. Wilson, Robert, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 511-18, October.
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