IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prg/jnlpep/v2006y2006i2id280p113-134.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Institutional Conditions of Monetary Policy Conduct in the Czech Republic

Author

Listed:
  • Petr Sedláček

Abstract

This paper tries to assess the conditions under which the CNB operates. Using a basic framework suggested by Mishkin (2000), the aim is to find out whether the central bank is able to conduct high-quality monetary policy. First, general principles that central banks should follow to succeed in their pursuit of monetary goals are theoretically introduced. Then, these theoretical principles are looked at in the Czech context. Issues of the strictness and suitability of concrete monetary policy of the CNB will not be dealt with, rather institutional circumstances that potentially allow successful policy are at the centre of this paper. It is concluded that the CNB is functioning in a moderately good environment, but still much room for improvement does exist.

Suggested Citation

  • Petr Sedláček, 2006. "Institutional Conditions of Monetary Policy Conduct in the Czech Republic," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2006(2), pages 113-134.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2006:y:2006:i:2:id:280:p:113-134
    DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.280
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://pep.vse.cz/doi/10.18267/j.pep.280.html
    Download Restriction: free of charge
    File URL: http://pep.vse.cz/doi/10.18267/j.pep.280.pdf
    Download Restriction: free of charge
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.18267/j.pep.280?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. International Monetary Fund, 2002. "Czech Republic Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes?Fiscal Transparency Banking Supervision Insurance Regulation Securities Regulation Payment Systems and Monetary and Financial Policy Tran," IMF Staff Country Reports 2002/169, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Fischer, Stanley, 1995. "Central-Bank Independence Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 201-206, May.
    3. Thomas I. Palley, 2003. "The Backward–Bending Phillips Curve And The Minimum Unemployment Rate Of Inflation: Wage Adjustment With Opportunistic Firms," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 71(1), pages 35-50, January.
    4. Allsop, Christopher & Vines, David, 2000. "The Assessment: Macroeconomic Policy," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 16(4), pages 1-32, Winter.
    5. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
    6. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
    7. M J Oliver, 2001. "In Search of a Nominal Anchor," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 6(1), pages 33-46, March.
    8. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008. "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December.
    2. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5221 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Akhand Akhtar Hossain, 2009. "Central Banking and Monetary Policy in the Asia-Pacific," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12777.
    4. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Bruno Ducoudre, 2008. "Structure par terme des taux d’intérêt et anticipations de la politique économique," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/5221, Sciences Po.
    6. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/f4rshpf3v1umfa09lat09b1bg is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Christopher Allsopp, 2002. "Macroeconomic Policy Rules in Theory and in Practice," Discussion Papers 10, Monetary Policy Committee Unit, Bank of England.
    8. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Libich, Jan, 2006. "Central Bank Independence, Accountability and Transparency: Complements or Strategic Substitutes?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5470, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Rodolfo Tomás Da Fonseca Nicolay & Gabriel Caldas Montes, 2014. "Comunicação Do Banco Central,Expectativas De Inflação E Profecia Auto-Realizável: Evidências Para Obrasil," Anais do XL Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 40th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 046, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    10. Roberto Tamborini, 2007. "Rescuing the LM (and the money market) in a modern Macro course," Department of Economics Working Papers 0706, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    11. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/f4rshpf3v1umfa09lat09b1bg is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Singleton,John, 2010. "Central Banking in the Twentieth Century," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521899093.
    13. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/f4rshpf3v1umfa09lat09b1bg is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Paul Hubert, 2010. "Monetary policy, imperfect information and the expectations channel [Politique monétaire,information imparfaite et canal des anticipations]," SciencePo Working papers Main tel-04095385, HAL.
    15. Paul Hubert, 2010. "Monetary Policy, Imperfect Information and the Expectations Channel," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/f4rshpf3v1u, Sciences Po.
    16. Kui-Wai Li, 2013. "The US monetary performance prior to the 2008 crisis," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(24), pages 3450-3461, August.
    17. repec:zbw:bofitp:2008_015 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Pelin Ilbas, 2006. "Optimal Monetary Policy rules for the Euro area in a DSGE framework," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven ces0613, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    19. Jean Barthélemy & Eric Mengus, 2017. "Credibility and Monetary Policy," Working Papers hal-03457527, HAL.
    20. Carlo Altavilla, 2003. "Assessing monetary rules performance across EMU countries," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(2), pages 131-151.
    21. Kuikeu, Oscar, 2011. "Arguments contre la zone franc [Against the cfa franc zone]," MPRA Paper 33710, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. Carlin Wendy & Soskice David, 2005. "The 3-Equation New Keynesian Model --- A Graphical Exposition," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-38, December.
    23. Bennett T. McCallum & Edward Nelson, 2004. "Timeless perspective vs. discretionary monetary policy in forward-looking models," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 86(Mar), pages 43-56.
    24. Gunther Schnabl, 2012. "Monetary Policy Reform in a World of Central Banks," Global Financial Markets Working Paper Series 26-2012, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    25. Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    monetary policy; independence; accountability; central bank; institution; price stability; benchmark;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2006:y:2006:i:2:id:280:p:113-134. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Stanislav Vojir (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/uevsecz.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.