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Historical and Philosophical Background of New Deal
[Historické a myšlenkové pozadí New Dealu]

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  • Ladislav Tajovský

Abstract

The article "Historical and Philosophical Background of New Deal" deals with historical and philosophical origins of 1932 economic platform of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. New Deal was a reaction to the Great Depression 1929 - 1933, the hardest and the deepest crisis of the modern capitalism. Its attendant circumstances - decline of product, deflation and record-breaking unemployment - caused considerable shifts in the social perception of the role of the state in the economy. However, New Deal was not a consistent package of reform projects - the most significant feature was the pragmatic activism and the willingness to reply to the economic fluctuations. The aim of this article is to get to the roots of social-economic thoughts of the authors of New Deal. The conclusion is that for a long time before the Great Depression came there was strong tendency to strengthten state's power, especially concerning the federal institutions. Franklin D. Roosevelt thus went further the same direction as his progressive or conservative predecessors.

Suggested Citation

  • Ladislav Tajovský, 2005. "Historical and Philosophical Background of New Deal [Historické a myšlenkové pozadí New Dealu]," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2005(3), pages 128-151.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlaop:v:2005:y:2005:i:3:id:154:p:128-151
    DOI: 10.18267/j.aop.154
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gorton, Gary, 1985. "Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the United States," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(2), pages 277-283, June.
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