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On The Allegedly Invisible Dutch Construction Sector Cartel

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  • Peter A.G. van Bergeijk

Abstract

This paper considers an extensive cartel contamination of markets in the Dutch construction sector. Overwhelming legal evidence of bid rigging in this sector was obtained in 486 leniency applications in which complete secret accounts were submitted. I offer a case study and a broadly based post mortem of methodologies that were applied earlier to detect malfunctioning markets in the Netherlands, but failed to identify the construction sector as problematic. It is concluded that these studies were seriously flawed. Theoretical and empirical economic forensics (if properly applied) creates value for antitrust authorities in detection of antitrust violations directly, or by informing them where to look for direct evidence.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 2008. "On The Allegedly Invisible Dutch Construction Sector Cartel," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 115-128.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:4:y:2008:i:1:p:115-128.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nhm021
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2003. "Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 79-105, September.
    2. Peter A.G. van Bergeijk & Robert C.G. Haffner, 1996. "Privatization, Deregulation and the Macroeconomy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 905.
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    Cited by:

    1. van Bergeijk, P.A.G., 2009. "What could anti-trust in the OECD do for development?," ISS Working Papers - General Series 18720, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.
    2. Xiaowei Wang & Wuyan Long & Meiyue Sang & Yang Yang, 2022. "Towards Sustainable Urbanization: Exploring the Influence Paths of the Urban Environment on Bidders’ Collusive Willingness," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-14, February.
    3. Ghosal Vivek, 2011. "The Law and Economics of Enhancing Cartel Enforcement: Using Information From Non-Cartel Investigations to Prosecute Cartels," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 501-538, December.
    4. In Lee & Kyungdong Hahn, 2002. "Bid-Rigging in Auctions for Korean Public-Works Contracts and Potential Damage," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 21(1), pages 73-88, August.

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