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Group Meeting Frequency and Borrowers’ Repayment Performance in Microfinance: Evidence from a Quasi-natural Experiment in South Africa

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  • Lucia Dalla Pellegrina
  • Angela De Michele
  • Giorgio Di Maio
  • Paolo Landoni
  • Susanna Parravicini

Abstract

A quasi-natural experiment has been carried out at The Small Enterprise Foundation, a South African microfinance institution offering group lending with joint liability. In a pilot project, the frequency of meetings was reduced from fortnightly to monthly and the members of the groups were no more required to attend all the meetings but they could send a representative. After selecting a suitable control group using propensity score matching techniques, we ran difference-in-difference regressions to evaluate the impact of the policy changes. Estimates suggest that the pilot project increased loan repayment delays and decreased groups’ deposits, but it had a negligible impact on groups’ savings balances. Text mining techniques, applied to survey data, pointed towards the lack of trust within the groups whose members did not meet frequently outside the repayment meetings as one of the causes of the negative outcomes of the pilot experiment. We conclude that group meetings are an effective tool to stimulate the accumulation of social capital among microcredit borrowers.

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  • Lucia Dalla Pellegrina & Angela De Michele & Giorgio Di Maio & Paolo Landoni & Susanna Parravicini, 2021. "Group Meeting Frequency and Borrowers’ Repayment Performance in Microfinance: Evidence from a Quasi-natural Experiment in South Africa," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 30(5), pages 447-477.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jafrec:v:30:y:2021:i:5:p:447-477.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dalla Pellegrina, Lucia & De Michele, Angela & Di Maio, Giorgio & Landoni, Paolo, 2021. "Fostering savings by commitment: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment at The Small Enterprise Foundation in South Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    2. Li, Qinghai & Yu, Yangcheng & Li, Yanru & Sun, Guanglin, 2023. "Heterogeneous Social network shape ability and willingness of rural residents to repay loans in China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    3. Gehrig, Stefan & Mesoudi, Alex & Lamba, Shakti, 2020. "Banking on cooperation: An evolutionary analysis of microfinance loan repayment behaviour," OSF Preprints tmpqj, Center for Open Science.
    4. Amani Gration Tegambwage & Pendo Shukrani Kasoga, 2022. "Loan repayment among group borrowers in Tanzania: the role of relationship quality," Future Business Journal, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 1-11, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    microfinance; group lending; group meetings; quasi-natural experiment; repayment delay; savings; JEL Classification: G21; I25; L31; O15;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
    • I25 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Economic Development

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