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Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Politics? Evidence from China

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Author Info

  • Hongbin Li
  • Lingsheng Meng
  • Junsen Zhang

Abstract

This article examines the determinants of the entrepreneur's political participation by employing a unique matched firm-institution data set from China. We find that the likelihood of an entrepreneur's participation can be explained by the underdevelopment of markets and market-supporting institutions. According to our estimates, the probability of entering politics decreases by 8--20% from the mean when the institutional indices improve by one standard deviation. Our findings support the view that the institutional environment shapes the private entrepreneur's motivation to participate in politics; they also provide an example of how private entrepreneurs respond to state/market failure in developing and transition countries. (JEL G1, H00, O10, P2, P3) Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 44 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 559-578

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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:44:y:2006:i:3:p:559-578

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References

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  1. John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 2002. "The Central Role of Entrepreneurs in Transition Economies," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 153-170, Summer.
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  7. Guriev, Sergei, 2003. "Red Tape and Corruption," CEPR Discussion Papers 3972, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Konstantin Sonin, 2003. "Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights," Working Papers w0022, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  9. Naughton, Barry, 1994. "Chinese Institutional Innovation and Privatization from Below," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 266-70, May.
  10. Loren Brandt & Hongbin Li, 2002. "Bank Discrimination in Transition Economies: Ideology, Information or Incentives?," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 517, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  11. Frye, Timothy & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 354-58, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Scott Gehlbach & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006. "Businessman Candidates," Working Papers w0067, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  2. Weiwen Li & Ai He & Hailin Lan & Daphne Yiu, 2012. "Political connections and corporate diversification in emerging economies: Evidence from China," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 799-818, September.
  3. Wenxuan Hou & Geoff Moore, 2010. "Player and Referee Roles Held Jointly: The Effect of State Ownership on China’s Regulatory Enforcement Against Fraud," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 317-335, September.
  4. Chen, Maggie, 2009. "The Matching of Heterogeneous Firms and Politicians," MPRA Paper 23508, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Chong, Terence Tai-Leung & Lu, Liping & Ongena, Steven, 2013. "Does banking competition alleviate or worsen credit constraints faced by small- and medium-sized enterprises? Evidence from China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 3412-3424.
  6. Liu, Qigui & Tang, Jinghua & Tian, Gary Gang, 2013. "Does political capital create value in the IPO market? Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 395-413.
  7. Lu, Jiangyong & Xu, Bin & Liu, Xiaohui, 2007. "The Effects of Corporate Governance and Institutional Environments on Export Behaviour: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms," MPRA Paper 6600, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Yang, Ruilong & Wang, Yuan & Nie, Huihua, 2012. "“准官员”的晋升机制:来自中国央企的证据
    [The Political Promotion for Quasi-Government Officers: Evidence from Central State-owned Enterprises in China]
    ," MPRA Paper 50317, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Sep 2013.
  9. Li, Hongbin & Meng, Lingsheng & Shi, Xinzheng & Wu, Binzhen, 2012. "Does having a cadre parent pay? Evidence from the first job offers of Chinese college graduates," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 513-520.
  10. Hasan, Iftekhar & Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kowalewski , Oskar & Kozlowski , Lukasz, 2014. "Politically connected firms in Poland and their access to bank financing," BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/2014, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
  11. Li, Hongbin & Meng, Lingsheng & Wang, Qian & Zhou, Li-An, 2008. "Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 283-299, October.
  12. Chong, T.T.L. & Lu, L. & Ongena, S., 2012. "Does Banking Competition Alleviate or Worsen Credit Constraints Faced by Small and Medium Enterprises? Evidence from China (Replaces CentER DP 2011-006)," Discussion Paper 2012-013, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  13. Hongbin Li & PakWai Liu & Junsen Zhang & Ning Ma, 2007. "Economic Returns to Communist Party Membership: Evidence From Urban Chinese Twins," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(523), pages 1504-1520, October.
  14. Ying Chen & David Touve, 2011. "Conformity, political participation, and economic rewards: The case of Chinese private entrepreneurs," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 529-553, September.
  15. Feng, Xunan & Johansson, Anders C. & Zhang, Tianyu, 2013. "Mixing Business with Politics: Political Participation by Entrepreneurs in China," Working Paper Series 2013-28, Stockholm China Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics.
  16. Söderbom, Måns & Weng, Qian, 2012. "Multi-product firms, product mix changes and upgrading: Evidence from China's state-owned forest areas," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 801-818.
  17. Ma, Liangbo & Ma, Shiguang & Tian, Gary, 2013. "Political connections, founder-managers, and their impact on tunneling in China's listed firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 312-339.
  18. Lili Pi & Julian Lowe, 2011. "Can a powerful CEO avoid involuntary replacement?—An empirical study from China," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 775-805, December.

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