Environmental Protection in the Federalist System: The Political Economy of NPDES Inspections
AbstractThis paper examines the consequences of the delegation of regulatory authority to local officials. The study evaluates three hypotheses of the role delegation plays in the implementation of regulatory policy: (1) the federal case, which predicts that delegation has no effect; (2) the state/local model predicts that delegation is, in fact, abdication; and (3) the full impact model predicts that both interests determine how environmental policy is implemented. The results provide evidence that, while delegation does not completely remove national policymaker ability to alter regulatory policy, it does allow local interests to alter national standards. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 36 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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