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Measuring the Performance of Chile’s Tax Administration

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  • Serra, Pablo

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to measure the effectiveness of Chile’s Internal Revenue Service (SII). We assume that its goal is to achieve maximum compliance from taxpayers while minimizing compliance costs. Sample taxpayer surveys and statistical data both show that SII service standards-a proxy for compliance costs-improved during the 1990s. Compliance rates also increased significantly in the same period. Regression analysis, however, suggests that this is largely explained by the country’s strong economic growth during the decade. Our preferred performance indicator-the degree to which observed compliance falls short of its maximum achievable level-displays no change.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by National Tax Association in its journal National Tax Journal.

Volume (Year): 56 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 373-83

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Handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:56:y:2003:i:2:p:373-83

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Cited by:
  1. Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge, 2013. "Taxation and development: A review of donor support to strengthen tax systems in developing countries," Working Paper Series, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  2. Taliercio, Robert Jr., 2004. "Designing performance: the semi-autonomous revenue authority model in Africa and Latin America," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank 3423, The World Bank.
  3. James, Simon & Edwards, Alison, 2008. "Developing Tax Policy in a Complex and Changing World," Economic Analysis and Policy (EAP), Queensland University of Technology (QUT), School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology (QUT), School of Economics and Finance, vol. 38(1), pages 35-53, March.
  4. Pablo Serra, 2000. "Fundamentos para una Reforma Tributaria en Chile," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 37(111), pages 299-322.

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