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Impact of the agent theory on private and public companies based on the analysis of Croatian health care system

Author

Listed:
  • Martina Sopta

    (Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb)

  • Mihaela Mikić

    (Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb)

  • Matej BotiÄ ki

Abstract

For years, the Republic of Croatia has been faced with the challenge of sustainability of its health care system due to the inefficiency of public health care institutions. It is generally believed that such development is the cause of health care system structure itself, which provides health care to all citizens. This paper seeks to explore whether public health care institutions can be more effective despite the system structure itself. The basic premise of the paper is that public health care institutions are ineffective because of the agent theory impact. In order to examine that premise, it is necessary to compare public and private health care institutions. The aim of this paper is to find out whether there is a greater impact of the agent theory in public health institutions in regard to different influence of private and public ownership on the management methods. The research methodology refers to the financial analysis of selected private and public health institutions. The examination of the professional qualification of managing directors of these institutions showed that there are no major differences in the share of experts in the field of economics in private and public institutions. Efficiency analysis based on the specific institutions shows that public health institutions are more ineffective than the private ones when it comes to cost management. Based on this, the conclusion is that the agent theory impact is more prevalent in public health care institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Martina Sopta & Mihaela Mikić & Matej BotiÄ ki, 2017. "Impact of the agent theory on private and public companies based on the analysis of Croatian health care system," Notitia - journal for economic, business and social issues, Notitia Ltd., vol. 1(3), pages 103-124, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:noa:journl:y:2017:i:3:p:103-124
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    agent theory; public health care institutions; health care system; private ownership; public ownership;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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