IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/nms/untern/10.5771-0042-059x-2011-4-312.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Weg von der Agenturtheorie? Aber was dann?

Author

Listed:
  • Walgenbach, Peter

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Walgenbach, Peter, 2011. "Weg von der Agenturtheorie? Aber was dann?," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 65(4), pages 312-319.
    • Handle: RePEc:nms:untern:10.5771/0042-059x-2011-4-312
    DOI: 10.5771/0042-059X-2011-4-312
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/10.5771/0042-059X-2011-4-312
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.5771/0042-059X-2011-4-312?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-349, June.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. Ruth V. Aguilera & Igor Filatotchev & Howard Gospel & Gregory Jackson, 2008. "An Organizational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: Costs, Contingencies, and Complementarities," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(3), pages 475-492, June.
    4. Franck, Egon, 2011. "Ist es an der Zeit, die Aktionärsrechte zu stärken?," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 65(3), pages 201-214.
    5. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    6. Teppo Felin & Nicolai J. Foss, 2009. "Social Reality, the Boundaries of Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, and Economics," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 654-668, June.
    7. Herbert A. Simon, 1991. "Organizations and Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 25-44, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Franck Egon, 2012. "Zu den offenen Fragen des Board Primacy Konzeptes in der oekonomischen Theorie der Corporate Governance," Working Papers 0155, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
    2. Kürsten, Wolfgang, 2013. "35 Jahre Jensen/Meckling und das Missverständnis um die (wahre) Zielfunktion der Aktionäre – Finanzierungstheoretisches Plädoyer zur Eignung der Principal-Agent-Theorie für die Lösung von Problemen de," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 67(1), pages 8-22.
    3. Franck, Egon, 2013. "Zu den offenen Fragen des Board Primacy Konzeptes in der Theorie der Corporate Governance," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 67(1), pages 23-35.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. van Lent, L.A.G.M., 1999. "Incomplete contracting theory in empirical accounting research," Other publications TiSEM 088f797d-9fa4-4081-98f4-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Franck, Egon, 2013. "Zu den offenen Fragen des Board Primacy Konzeptes in der Theorie der Corporate Governance," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 67(1), pages 23-35.
    3. Menard, Claude, 1995. "Markets as institutions versus organizations as markets? Disentangling some fundamental concepts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 161-182, October.
    4. Franck Egon, 2012. "Zu den offenen Fragen des Board Primacy Konzeptes in der oekonomischen Theorie der Corporate Governance," Working Papers 0155, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
    5. Tarek Roshdy Gebba & Mohamed Gamal Aboelmaged, 2016. "Corporate Governance of UAE Financial Institutions: A Comparative Study between Conventional and Islamic Banks," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 6(5), pages 1-7.
    6. Evans, Lewis & Meade, Richard, 2005. "The Role and Significance of Cooperatives in New Zealand Agriculture, A Comparative Institutional Analysis," Working Paper Series 3847, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    7. J. David Cummins & Mary A. Weiss & Hongmin Zi, 1998. "Organizational Form and Efficiency: An Analysis of Stock and Mutual Property-Liability Insurers," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 97-02, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    8. Brogi, Marina & Lagasio, Valentina, 2022. "Better safe than sorry. Bank corporate governance, risk-taking, and performance," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
    9. Isabelle Le Breton–Miller & Danny Miller, 2006. "Why Do Some Family Businesses Out–Compete? Governance, Long–Term Orientations, and Sustainable Capability," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 30(6), pages 731-746, November.
    10. Panagiotis Staikouras & Christos Staikouras & Maria-Eleni Agoraki, 2007. "The effect of board size and composition on European bank performance," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-27, February.
    11. Maug, Ernst, 1997. "Boards of directors and capital structure: Alternative forms of corporate restructuring," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 113-139, April.
    12. Wiwattanakantang, Yupana, 1999. "An empirical study on the determinants of the capital structure of Thai firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 7(3-4), pages 371-403, August.
    13. Paul Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2003. "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 107-156.
    14. Agarwal, Vikas & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naik, Narayan Y., 2009. "Role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance," CFR Working Papers 04-04, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    15. Corten, Maarten & Steijvers, Tensie & Lybaert, Nadine, 2017. "The effect of intrafamily agency conflicts on audit demand in private family firms: The moderating role of the board of directors," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 13-28.
    16. Attiya Y. Javid & Robina Iqbal, 2010. "Corporate Governance in Pakistan : Corporate Valuation, Ownership and Financing," Governance Working Papers 22830, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    17. Carine Catelin & Céline Chatelin, 2001. "Privatisation, gouvernement d'entreprise et processus décisionnel:une intégration de la dynamique organisationnelle à travers le cas de France Télécom," Working Papers CREGO 1010501, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    18. Evans, Lewis T & Quigley, Neil C, 1995. "Shareholder Liability Regimes, Principal-Agent Relationships, and Banking Industry Performance," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 497-520, October.
    19. Farah, Bassam & Chakravarty, Dwarka & Dau, Luis & Beamish, Paul W., 2022. "Multinational enterprise parent-subsidiary governance and survival," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 57(2).
    20. Fumitoshi Mizutani & Eri Nakamura, 2014. "Managerial incentive, organizational slack, and performance: empirical analysis of Japanese firms’ behavior," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(1), pages 245-284, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nms:untern:10.5771/0042-059x-2011-4-312. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.nomos.de/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.