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Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General Model

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  • Norbert Schulz
  • Francesco Parisi
  • Ben Depoorter
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    Abstract

    This paper develops a general model of anticommons fragmentation in property. Using several related examples, we consider the equilibria obtained under different scenarios. The various illustrations are later utilized to develop a model of fragmented property. The model reveals that the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their individual decisions. Our model suggests that the results of underutilization of joint property increasemonotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation and (b) the forgone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. We explore some important implications for the institutional responses to issues of property fragmentation.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.

    Volume (Year): 158 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 594-

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    Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200212)158:4_594:fiptag_2.0.tx_2-r

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    Cited by:
    1. Francesco Parisi & Norbert Schulz & Ben Depoorter, 2004. "Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 175-190, March.
    2. José António Filipe & Manuel Alberto M. Ferreira & Manuel Coelho, 2007. "The Tragedy of the Anti-Commons: A New Problem. An Application to the Fisheries," Working Papers Department of Economics 2007/16, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, University of Lisbon.
    3. Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, 2011. "Toward an asymmetric Coase theorem," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 111-122, February.
    4. Parisi, Francesco & Schulz, Norbert & Klick, Jonathan, 2006. "Two dimensions of regulatory competition," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 56-66, March.
    5. Parente, Michael D. & Winn, Abel M., 2012. "Bargaining behavior and the tragedy of the anticommons," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 475-490.
    6. Giuseppe Bellantuono, 2014. "The regulatory anticommons of green infrastructures," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 325-354, April.

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