Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General Model
AbstractThis paper develops a general model of anticommons fragmentation in property. Using several related examples, we consider the equilibria obtained under different scenarios. The various illustrations are later utilized to develop a model of fragmented property. The model reveals that the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their individual decisions. Our model suggests that the results of underutilization of joint property increasemonotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation and (b) the forgone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. We explore some important implications for the institutional responses to issues of property fragmentation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 158 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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- Giuseppe Bellantuono, 2014. "The regulatory anticommons of green infrastructures," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 325-354, April.
- Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, 2011. "Toward an asymmetric Coase theorem," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 111-122, February.
- Parisi, Francesco & Schulz, Norbert & Klick, Jonathan, 2006. "Two dimensions of regulatory competition," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 56-66, March.
- Parente, Michael D. & Winn, Abel M., 2012. "Bargaining behavior and the tragedy of the anticommons," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 475-490.
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