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Negotiation in the Commons: Incorporating Field and Experimental Evidence into a Theory of Local Collective Action

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  • Jeffrey P. Carpenter

Abstract

This paper develops a model of community level collective action to explain the evolution of institutional solutions to social dilemmas. The assumptions of the model are based on evidence from ethnographic and experimental studies that show that the degree of excludability of a common pool resource affects agent behavior by forming the basis for an ingroup. The major predictions of the model are that members of a community will develop institutional rules to protect cooperation and that the level of cooperation will be determined endogenously by the community's rule choice. The results of a new experiment support these predictions.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 156 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 661-

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Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200012)156:4_661:nitcif_2.0.tx_2-2

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Cited by:
  1. Parisi, Francesco & Schulz, Norbert & Depoorter, Ben, 2003. "Symmetry and asymmetry in property: Commons and anticommons," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 46, University of Würzburg, Chair for Monetary Policy and International Economics.
  2. Gerlinde Fellner & Magdalena Margreiter & Nuria Oses Eraso, 2003. "When the past is present – The ratchet effect in the local commons," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-23, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  3. Apesteguia, Jose, 2006. "Does information matter in the commons?: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-69, May.
  4. Bradley J. Ruffle & Richard H. Sosis, 2003. "Cooperation and the In-Group-Out-Group Bias: A Field Test on Israeli Kibbutz Members and City Residents," Experimental 0310002, EconWPA.
  5. Schulz, Norbert & Parisi, Francesco & Depoorter, Ben, 2001. "Fragmentation in property: Towards a general model," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 32, University of Würzburg, Chair for Monetary Policy and International Economics.

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