An Alternative Algorithm for Identifying Free Riders Based on a No-Free-Rider Nash Equilibrium
Abstract
In identifying the free riders in the voluntary provision of a pure public good, Andreoni and McGuire (1993) simplify Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian's (1986)algorithm by systematizing the selection process of potential contributors. We propose an alternative algorithm in which a concept of no-free-rider Nash equilibrium is utilized to identify potentially a large fraction of free riders in Nash equilibrium without conducting any Nash solution tests for them.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal FinanzArchiv.
Volume (Year): 63 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 278-284
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Web page: http://www.mohr.de/fa
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Related research
Keywords: public goods; free riders; algorithm; no-free-rider Nash equilibrium;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Buchholz, Wolfgang & Cornes, Richard & Rübbelke, Dirk, 2011.
"Interior matching equilibria in a public good economy: An aggregative game approach,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 639-645, August.
- Buchholz, Wolfgang & Cornes, Richard & Rübbelke, Dirk, 2011. "Interior matching equilibria in a public good economy: An aggregative game approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 639-645.
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