Signaling strength? An analysis of decision making in The Weakest Link
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.
Volume (Year): 71 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341
Game show; Field experiments; Signaling;
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