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Response to Bonanno and Nehring

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  • Robert Stalnaker

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  • Robert Stalnaker, 1998. "Response to Bonanno and Nehring," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 297-299, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:45:y:1998:i:3:p:297-299
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1005043021942
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stalnaker, Robert, 1996. "Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 133-163, October.
    2. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, 1998. "On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 291-295, December.
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