On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.
Volume (Year): 45 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341
Nash equilibrium; Perfect information games; Stalnaker's notion;
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- Robert Stalnaker, 1998. "Response to Bonanno and Nehring," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 297-299, December.
- Michael Trost, 2013. "Epistemic characterizations of iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles in preference-based type spaces," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 755-776, August.
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