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On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games

Author

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  • Giacomo Bonanno
  • Klaus Nehring

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, 1998. "On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 291-295, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:45:y:1998:i:3:p:291-295
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1005090905103
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bonanno, Giacomo & Tsakas, Elias, 2018. "Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 231-241.
    2. Michael Trost, 2013. "Epistemic characterizations of iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles in preference-based type spaces," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(3), pages 755-776, August.
    3. Giacomo Bonanno, 2012. "Epistemic foundations of game theory," Working Papers 70, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    4. Giacomo Bonanno & Elias Tsakas, 2017. "Qualitative analysis of common belief of rationality in strategic-form games," Working Papers 181, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    5. Robert Stalnaker, 1998. "Response to Bonanno and Nehring," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 297-299, December.
    6. Giacomo Bonanno & Elias Tsakas, 2017. "Qualitative analysis of common belief of rationality in strategic-form games," Working Papers 175, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    7. Giacomo Bonanno, 2007. "A Syntactic Approach to Rationality in Games," Working Papers 247, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    8. Guarino, Pierfrancesco & Ziegler, Gabriel, 2022. "Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 559-585.

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