Profit Sharing, Risk Sharing, and Firm Size: Implications of Efficiency Wages
AbstractBy taking account of output fluctuations, this paper constructs a synthesis of profit-sharing and efficiency-wage models to highlight the role of the risk attitudes of the firm and its employees. We show, contrary to the traditional efficiency wage theory, that in a profit-sharing economy unemployment is no longer a necessary device to induce work effort and, consequently, the labor market equilibrium may be characterized by full employment. Such a result is more likely to be true when the economy is characterized by small-sized firms. In addition, we also provide a preliminary sketch of the situations in which the firm chooses a profit-sharing program or a fixed-wage one, and discuss how a firm determines its pay parameters and employment in response to output fluctuations. Copyright Springer 2006
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Small Business Economics.
Volume (Year): 27 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100338
Profit sharing; Risk sharing; Efficiency wages; Firm size; J33; J41; D82; J21;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
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